Pope
Benedict XVI prays barefoot
at the Blue Mosque
Introduction
___________
For those
not familiar with him, Pope Benedict XVI, who calls Islam a “religion of peace,
tolerance, and love” (see above quote), is the head of the Catholic
Church, a worldwide and influential religious institution. The Catholic
Church is not a Muslim sect, and the popes of the medieval past -- who in
fact referred to Muslims as ‘heathens’ and ‘infidels’ -- would have called
Benedict an ‘anti-Christ’ (an agent of ‘Satan’) and burned him alive at the
stake for praying in a mosque toward Mecca while functioning as a priest of
the Church.
Some things
have obviously changed in the Catholic Church.
One might
say that the Catholic Church is joining the spirit of the times, because Pope
Benedict’s assessment of Islam is very common in the Western mass media. This
admits of a simple statistical demonstration.
On 7
January 2007, I asked the Lexis-Nexis database to give me all appearances,
just in the major Western newspapers it archives, of the word ‘Islam’ within
10 words of the phrase ‘religion of peace,’ and it returned 738 results. By
contrast, when I asked for all appearances in the same database of the word
‘Islam’ within 10 words of ‘religion of war’ I got only 66 results.
This means
that Westerners hear in the mainstream mass media that Islam is a ‘religion
of peace’ more than 11 times more often than they hear the opposite argument.
(And many of those 66 results, I must point out, were about how specific
individuals got in trouble for saying that Islam was a ‘religion of
war,’ so the true ratio is arguably higher.)
If we
accept the common media representation of Islam, then those Muslims who quite
obviously and openly preach war cannot be true or orthodox Muslims
(despite the fact that they seem quite numerous), and therefore some
qualifier will be needed to label their movements. Thus, we often encounter
the terms ‘fundamentalist Islam,’ ‘radical Islam,’ ‘Islamo-fascism,’
‘Islamism,’ and ‘Islamist terrorism’ when the media makes reference to
warlike Muslim movements.
By logical
necessity, under this interpretation, the term ‘moderate Islam’ will refer to
those Muslims who adhere to the traditional, orthodox, and true nature of
Islam, which in this view is peace. Should we rush to accept this
common media representation of Islam, now pushed also by the head of the
Catholic Church?
I think that
might be rash.
Although
Pope Benedict XVI is certainly entitled to his own opinion, he is not a
Muslim cleric or scholar. So before we commit ourselves to an interpretation
it is probably wise at least to consult the recognized Muslim authorities on
what the mission of Islam is supposed to be. If the interpretation of Muslim
authorities agrees with Pope Benedict, very well. But if it doesn’t, it would
be absurd to privilege the views of the Catholic Pope over the views of those
who have defined Islam for millions of Muslims throughout the ages.
The first thing I will do is contrast the modern media
interpretation of the word jihad, the central concept in Islam, with
that of a famous 20th century Muslim cleric and scholar. Then I will look at
the views of medieval Muslim clerics and scholars, and finally at the views
of modern Muslims whom the Western mass media loudly calls 'moderates.'
___________________________________________________________
Table of Contents
█
Introduction (above)
█ The
meaning of jihad in the modern media, against that of a prominent 20th c.
Muslim cleric and scholar
█ Medieval
Islam and its understanding of jihad
█
According to Western officials and the mainstream mass media, what is
a modern ‘moderate Muslim’?
█ Do
genuine ‘moderate Muslims’ exist?
___________________________________________________________
The meaning of jihad in the modern
media, against that of a prominent 20th c. Muslim cleric and scholar
______________________________________
What does
the word jihad mean? These days it is common for the mass media to
present us with Muslims who defend the view that jihad -- which is
commonly translated as ‘holy war’ -- can have many different meanings, and
that its primary meaning has nothing to do with violence (naturally because
Islam is ‘the religion of peace’). For example, Riaz
Hassan, writing in the South China Morning Post, explains:
“…jihad can be viewed as a revolutionary process in
stages, proceeding from the spiritual to the temporal realm of politics. This
interpretation is counter to the prevailing conception in the West... which
views jihad in terms of destruction and suffering inflicted by
religious fanatics on civilian populations.”[2]
In other
words, Hassan is saying that only Muslim “religious fanatics” will use the
word jihad to mean ‘terrorism’: “destruction and suffering inflicted…on
civilian populations.” According to him, the word really has, primarily, a
“spiritual” interpretation.
Western
public figures routinely endorse such arguments. For example, in 1993, in a
speech at the Sheldonian Theater in Oxford, where Charles the Prince of
Wales is a patron of the Center for Islamic Studies, the future King of
England said that “The guiding principle and spirit of Islamic law, taken
straight from the Qur’an, should be those of equity and compassion.”[2a] Strong stuff.
Immediately
after the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, which US
president George W. Bush attributed to a self-consciously Muslim terrorist
organization, “President Bush join[ed American]
Muslim leaders… to defend Islam as a religion of peace, not terrorism.”[3]
Prince
Charles and President Bush obviously agree with Riaz
Hassan that any Muslim giving Islam’s central concept, jihad, a
terrorist interpretation is a “religious fanatic,” not a mainstream, orthodox
Muslim.
It is true
that Bush made his statement surrounded by American Muslim leaders, but in
the United States Islam is a minority religion, and in the context of a
terrorist attack for which a self-consciously Muslim terrorist was taking
responsibility, it was obviously politic for American Muslim leaders to agree
publicly with Bush. It will be instructive, therefore, to see what a Muslim
cleric and scholar in a majority Muslim country says about Islam.
I turn,
therefore, to the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
who led the creation of an Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979. On the question
of whether Islam is a religion of peace, Khomeini expressed himself with
great clarity in a speech entitled Islam is not a Religion of Pacifists,
as follows:
“Those who know nothing of Islam pretend that Islam counsels
against war. Those [who say this] are witless. Islam says: Kill all the
unbelievers just as they would kill you all! Does this mean that Muslims
should sit back until they are devoured by [the unbelievers]? Islam says:
Kill them [the non Muslims], put them to the sword
and scatter [their armies]. Does this mean sitting back until [non-Muslims]
overcome us? Islam says: Kill in the service of Allah those who may want to
kill you! Does this mean that we should surrender [to the enemy]? Islam says:
Whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword and in the shadow of the
sword! People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the
key to paradise, which can be opened only for holy warriors!
There are hundreds of other [Koranic] psalms and hadiths
[sayings of Muhammad, the founder of Islam] urging Muslims to value war and
to fight. Does all this mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from
waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim.”[4]
It would
appear that, concerning the nature of Islam, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini disagrees with the head of the Catholic Church, the future King of
England, and the President of the United States. Benedict XVI says that Islam
is “a religion of peace, tolerance, and love”; Prince Charles, claiming the
authority of the Qur’an, says that Islam is about “equity and compassion”;
and George Bush “defend[ed] Islam as a religion of
peace, not terrorism.” But Khomeini 1) called Islam a religion of war, 2) he
called for killing “all the unbelievers,” and 3) he was a major sponsor of
terrorism around the world.
Of course,
Khomeini has been called a ‘fundamentalist,’ a ‘fanatic,’ a ‘radical,’ and an
‘Islamist,’ which is supposed to mean that he does not represent mainstream
orthodox Islam. However, it is worth pointing out that unlike Pope Benedict,
Prince Charles, or President Bush, who are not even Muslims, Khomeini
was a widely respected cleric and scholar within Islam. And it is worth
noting also that Khomeini bases his views on the Qur’an and the sayings of
Muhammad.
In order to
establish whether Khomeini was inside or outside what has traditionally been
the Muslim mainstream, I shall now turn to the views of medieval Islamic
scholars and see whether they are any different from Khomeini's. Then I will
examine the views of modern Muslim authorities whom Western officials and the
Western mass media have gone out of their way to praise as great ‘moderates,’
and again test to see whether their views are at all different from
Khomeini’s. Done with that, I will examine how much room there is for
interpreting Muhammad’s legacy in order to produce that phenomenon we keep
hearing about: ‘moderate Islam.’
Medieval Islam and its understanding of jihad
_______________________________________
Medieval
Islam, like modern Islam, was not a monolithic religion: there were sharp
controversies, and different scholars defended contrasting views on many
different points. I make this clear at the outset because whenever one talks
about religion accusations easily fly that one has ‘painted with a broad
brush’ and ignored the ideological diversity.
But though
we must be fair to the various views within Islam, we must also recognize
that in a book-based religion the sacred texts will tether the debates around
a center of gravity. By measuring the distance that separates the various
disputants we can identify the point around which they all circle, thus
recognizing the ideological diversity but characterizing also the broad
agreement that keeps the disputants in the same intellectual community.
I will
examine the views of Abū Muhammad ‘Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa‘īd
ibn Hazm (or Ibn Hazm,
for mercy’s sake), relying on the French scholar Roger Arnaldez,
who wrote in 1962 an article entitled Holy War According to Ibn Hazm of Córdoba, where he examines the medieval
jurist’s views on the topic of jihad as expressed in his Kittab al-Muhalla.[5]
I have
chosen Ibn Hazm because he was 1) from a wealthy
and politically powerful family in Muslim Córdoba (Spain), 2) advisor to the
caliphs of the imperial Ummayad dynasty in the 12
century, and 3) one of the most prolific and influential theorists in Islam. Ibn
Hazm was mainstream.
Another
reason Ibn Hazm is convenient is that he sought to
write a polemic attacking the controversies that existed within Islam in his
time.
Ibn Hazm, says Arnaldez, expresses
“profound disgust” for the Muslim society in which he lives; his “purpose [is
to] jolt and rouse a Muslim community that he considers to have fallen
completely into religious decadence.”[6] The mistaken interpretations of other Muslim scholars were,
in his view, responsible for the sad state of Muslim society, and Ibn Hazm worked hard to refute these rival views. Thus, by
examining his writings, we can see what distance separated his views from
those of his opponents, and hence identify the intellectual center of gravity
of medieval Islamic civilization.
In order to
follow Roger Arnaldez my readers should know that
Islam traditionally divides the world into two regions, Dar al Islam,
and Dar al Harb. The first means the ‘House
of Islam’: the region where Muslims are a majority and politically dominant;
the second, revealingly, means the ‘House of War’: the rest of the world,
where Muslims are not yet dominant.
What did
Ibn Hazm think of jihad?
“As for
holy war,” Arnaldez explains, “it is clear that we
do not find in Ibn Hazm’s writings any attempt to
spiritualize the notion. For him, the jihad remains essentially a war
waged with arms…”[7] Summarizing Ibn Hazm’s
philosophy, Arnaldez says:
“Jihad is an obligation incumbent upon all Muslims. But
when some of them fulfill it, drive back the enemy and bring war (gazwa) to his home territory, when they defend the
frontier towns, the others are relieved of this obligation… Nevertheless, in
the case of an emergency, every believer who has no serious impediment can be
called up to fight. The Muslim in the Dar al Harb
who receives orders to fight must obey, unless he has a valid excuse. Ibn Hazm does not mean that the Muslims, even those who are
in fact relieved of the obligation, should dissociate themselves from the jihad
on the pretext that it is not a personal requirement in the highest degree (fard ‘ayn). The
texts that he cites are typical of his concern for keeping [all] the
believers [whether or not directly killing infidels] involved. The Qur’an, in
many verses, insists on this duty: Offer your help, whether you have little
or much weight, wage jihad by enlisting your property and your
persons. Now, Ibn Hazm says that this is a
‘general’ command, since there is no one who is not ‘either light or heavy.’
According to one hadith, ‘he who dies without having waged war (wa lam yagzu), or
without having harbored the hope of doing so (wa
lam yuhaddith bihl nafsahu), dies in a sort of hypocrisy.’ According to
another, the Prophet [Muhammad] declared: ‘No abandonment [of the cause]
after victory, but jihad and steadfast resolve (niyya).
And if you are called, come to their aid.’ It seems therefore, that besides
the war, strictly speaking, there is something like a permanent psychological
preparedness for war. In this latent form, the jihad must not cease.”[8]
In other
words, for Ibn Hazm jihad is much more than
armed combat against infidels to expand the frontiers of Dar al Islam;
jihad is the total contribution that every Muslim makes all
the time, in every way possible (excepting occasional valid
excuses) toward the success of the permanent war waged on the line dividing Dar
al Islam from Dar al Harb.
Arnaldez cites what Ibn Hazm -- basing
himself on the hadiths and the Qur’an -- considers the Islamic
obligations incumbent on non-combatants, and then makes the following
comment: “This text is interesting because it shows the antiquity of a very
broad concept of the jihad, which consists of making a fundamental
commitment to obey God in everything.”[9] The point of obeying God in everything is to maximize the
probability of success for armed combat on the frontiers of Islam: one’s
whole life must be oriented toward this goal.
As the
scholar Jacques Ellul once observed,
“jihad is an institution and not an event -- that is,
it is part of the normal functioning of the Muslim world.”[10]
The key
point is this: in the context of what he writes, if Ibn Hazm
was “profoundly disgusted” with the Islamic society of his times, then he was
upset that Muslims were going soft, distracting themselves from their supreme
obligation: war. Since Ibn Hazm was influential, it
follows that in medieval Islam moderation was perceived to be heterodox,
producing in reaction authoritative accusations of betrayal of Islam.
But Arnaldez explains that for Ibn Hazm
“it is not enough to be a mercenary run amok to enter Paradise.”[11] The Muslim jurist took pains to
clarify precisely how a good Muslim wages jihad, by following the law
in everything even as he kills the infidel.
Against
those who say that if two Muslims face three or more of the enemy it is legal
for them to flee (but not before), Ibn Hazm
demonstrates, with asperity, that the Qur’anic verse on which his opponents
base their affirmation has been interpreted in a frankly absurd
pseudo-literal manner. Islam does not specify any number. The Muslim must
always err on the side of attack even when the enemy’s strength is far
superior, retreating only when this is tactically advisable to wage a better
battle. Ibn Hazm doesn’t go so far as to defend an
obligation to ‘martyrdom’ (a suicidal attack), but he does make it clear that
martyrdom is positively valued.[12]
Abu Bakr,
another Muslim jurist, recommends not to cut any fruit trees or to destroy
the cultivated lands of the enemy. Ibn Hazm replies
that “in enemy territory it is permissible to burn the produce of the land,
the trees and the vineyards,” because the very “Prophet [Muhammad] set fire
to the palm groves of the Banu ‘l-Nadir, a Jewish tribe of Medina.” But Abu
Bakr is within his rights to make his recommendation, concedes Ibn Hazm, because there is not in fact an obligation
to destroy everything, merely a permission to do so, and the decision in each
particular case must be made by the commander.[13]
The great Malikite and Hanafite currents
within Islam allow the killing of all of the domestic animals which the
infidels possess because “war should bring destruction upon the enemy, and
everything that is not consumed by the Muslim invader must be rendered
unusable.”[14] But Ibn Hazm
replies -- in marked contrast with his views on the destruction of lands and
crops -- that this is forbidden, and that the domestic animals of the
infidels may not even be harmed (except for the pigs, for these must all be
killed).
Although
the foregoing reveals that for Ibn Hazm not
everything is allowed in war, he nevertheless agrees that against the
infidels themselves practically anything is permitted. For example, as Arnaldez explains, Ibn Hazm
maintains that
“The lives of women and children must be spared, at least when
they are not fighting in the ranks with the men. If they are struck down in
the course of a nighttime attack (bayat) or
unintentionally in the fray, there is no crime. Apart from these two
exceptions, it is permitted to kill all infidels, whether combatants or not:
merchants, hired servants or common laborers, old men, peasants, bishops,
priests or monks, the blind or the lame, without a single exception. Some
authors cite various hadiths in favor of other exceptions: old men,
monks, merchants. Ibn Hazm rejects them all. Nor
does he admit that the permission to kill is limited to combatants. As a
justification for his thesis, he recalls the Prophet’s [Muhammad’s]
extermination of all the men in the Jewish tribe of Banu Qurayza, who were
put to death without exception, while the women and the children were sold as
slaves.”[14a]
(It
is worth pointing out that Muhammad had done this with the Banu Qurayza after
they had willingly surrendered to Muhammad following his siege of
their stronghold.[14b])
Emphasizing
his point, Ibn Hazm affirms that, according to the
Prophet Muhammad, it is even legal to kill a very old man whose mind no
longer works very well if he never “made islam,”
which is to say if he never submitted to Allah, thus converting to the
true religion (the meaning of ‘Islam,’ in English translation, is usually
rendered as ‘submission’).
‘War booty’
refers to that property of infidels which the Muslim army takes by force.
Many Muslim scholars defended the view that, in many cases, even if the
property of a Muslim were found among the war booty (for example, a slave who
had escaped to Dar al Harb), this property
should not be returned to the Muslim owner but divided among the soldiers.
That such an opinion should have been so widespread provokes Arnaldez to comment: “This teaching is interesting
because it shows the importance that the Muslims attributed to the division
of booty [among the soldiers], over and above any other consideration.”[15]
Division of
the booty is obviously a strong incentive for Muslims to wage war. But Ibn Hazm carefully points out that an infidel cannot legally
own what was once the property of a Muslim, because he is a dirty infidel,
and so the soldiers may not take another Muslim’s property, even should they
find it among the war booty. As Arnaldez says, “The
very important thing about these indignant reactions is that Ibn Hazm affirms therein that only Muslim law counts, even
when it is a question of non-Muslims”[16]
Ibn Hazm obviously thought that many Muslim mercenaries were beyond
the pale, but not because they were in the habit of murdering all infidel men
and enslaving the women and children (he was in warm agreement with that),
but because they took the property of Muslims found in the war booty.
It is
important to see this: the problem was not that Muslim soldiers were
genocidal but corrupt. Here lay the decadence of medieval Muslim
society that so disgusted Ibn Hazm.
On the
topic of lying to the infidels, Ibn Hazm defends
the view that this is not a sin: treaties and oaths with infidels have no
validity and are made to be broken.[17] What would be a sin against a Muslim is justified with an
infidel because the defeat of infidels is the whole point of Islam.
The jurist
Abu Hanifa maintained that if an infidel in Dar
al Harb converted to Islam and stayed there
until the Muslims conquered his country, he should remain a free man when the
conquest happened and keep all of his movable property. His children who were
not yet of age would also become automatically Muslims and keep their
freedom. But the convert’s land, and the fetus in the womb of his wife, even
though Muslim, is part of the war booty (in Islamic law it is permissible for
a slave to be Muslim). And if the convert had migrated to Dar al Islam,
says Abu Hanifa, then everything he left behind
becomes part of the war booty when the conquest happens, and will be divided
among the soldiers. The same happens if he first came to Dar al Islam as
an infidel and then submitted, with the difference that, in this latter case,
his children are not automatically Muslims and form part of the war booty.
Ibn Hazm rejects all of Abu Hanifa's
teachings because they do not produce the proper incentive for conversion to
Islam: the laws must be designed so that infidels realize that the way to
protect themselves from Muslim soldiers is to convert. So Ibn Hazm states that he who submits to Allah may keep his
children and all his property regardless of where he finds himself when the
Muslims conquer his country. The exceptions are the wife and those children
who are already adults: these may legitimately be considered part of the war
booty, probably because, being adults, they may prove difficult to
indoctrinate and hence it is better to enslave them.[18]
This will suffice.
The distance that existed between the very influential Ibn Hazm and his opponents does not allow us to say that any
medieval jurist defended Islam as ‘the religion of peace.’ Clearly, they were
all agreed that Islam was the religion of war -- and terrorist war at
that. Here lay the ideological center of gravity. The reason is not far to
seek: Muhammad was fond of exterminating infidels, and in
particular Jews,[14b] Hence, Islamic jurists in the Middle Ages disagreed only
on just how much terrorist destruction it was lawful to apply, and the
specific manner of it.
It follows,
therefore, that the opinion of the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini -- and not that of Pope Benedict XVI, Prince Charles of Wales, or
President George W. Bush -- is the one that best matches the medieval Islamic
tradition.
According to Western officials and the mainstream mass media, what is a modern
‘moderate Muslim’? _______________________________________
You may
remember the civil wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. Much of this
happened in a place called Bosnia, populated by Slavic Muslims, Serbs, and
Croats. One of the main protagonists in the Bosnian civil wars was the
Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.
NATO backed
Alija Izetbegovic with force because, NATO
officials insisted, Izetbegovic was a moderate Muslim trying to preserve a
democratic, tolerant, and multi-ethnic Bosnia against what the same NATO
officials claimed were the racist and genocidal attacks of the Bosnian Serbs.
The Western mass media by and large repeated this representation as if it
were obviously true. Here follow a few samples of how Alija
Izetbegovic was represented.
In an official statement, the US State Department said after Alija Izetbegovic’s death:
“President Izetbegovic’s personal courage helped the Bosnian
people endure one of Europe's greatest tragedies since World War II. His
determined leadership was instrumental in Bosnia and Herzegovina remaining a
unified multiethnic country.”[19]
Warren Zimmerman, former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, wrote in
Foreign Affairs:
“Izetbegovic was…A devout Muslim but no extremist, he
consistently advocated the preservation of a multinational Bosnia.”[20]
The Financial Times, in a headline, called him a
“Former rebel with a pacifist cause.”[21]
The
Observer stated:
“Izetbegovic is rapidly emerging as an intelligent and
moderate mediator in the conflict in Yugoslavia.”[22]
The Independent:
“Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim
President of Bosnia, has tried to steer a moderate course.”[23]
The New York Times:
“The Bosnian President, Mr. Izetbegovic, a Muslim Slav
regarded by Western diplomats as a moderate.”[24]
The New York Times again:
“President Alija Izetbegovic, a
moderate Muslim Slav…”[25]
The Washington Post:
“Bosnian President Alija
IZETBEGOVIC, 70, a moderate Muslim often accused by the Serbs of trying to
set up a fundamentalist Islamic state…”[26]
Newsweek magazine,
“The government of Bosnian President Alija
Izetbegovic…has always been committed to a multiethnic society.”[27]
And Newsweek again:
“The moderate Muslim-led government of Alija
Izetbegovic…”[28]
Knight-Ridder News Service, in reference to Izetbegovic’s
movement, stated that,
“The Bosnian [Muslims] are struggling for democracy, human
rights, and a multiethnic country.”[29]
Inter-Press Service:
“Izetbegovic, a moderate Muslim intellectual…”[30]
United Press International:
“President Alija Izetbegovic, a
Muslim nationalist who is considered a pro-reform moderate”[31]
Associated Press:
“Izetbegovic, 66, won a reputation as a moderate…”[32]
You can see
from the above why many people got the impression that Alija
Izetbegovic was a ‘moderate Muslim’: the media said that he was.
But it
would be silly to form an opinion of Izetbegovic from media claims when
Izetbegovic himself laid out in black and white what he believed. In a book
titled Islamic Declaration (sometimes translated as Islamic
Manifesto), and first published around 1970, Alija
Izetbegovic wrote:
“Oh Prophet, incite the believers to combat. If there can be
found among you twenty who will endure, they will vanquish two hundred, if
one hundred can be found, they will vanquish a thousand infidels, because
they are people such as cannot understand.”[33]
And also:
“And combat on Allah’s path those who combat you, and don’t
disobey. True, Allah does not love the disobedient! And kill them where you
will find them; chase them from where they chased you: association is a
graver sin than murder. But don’t fight them near the sacred Mosque unless
they fight you there first. And if they fight you there, kill them then. Such
is the retribution against infidels. Should they cease, Allah is, surely,
forgiving and merciful.”[33a]
I think
this line in particular is quite revealing: “association [with an infidel] is
a graver sin than murder [of a fellow Muslim],” because it tells us what the
Qur’anic attitude -- and Izetbegovic’s -- is toward Muslims who wanted to get
along with non-Muslims.
Izetbegovic
interprets the above two excerpts as a Quranic command on the question of how
to conduct “The Relations Between the Islamic Society and Other Societies,” for
that phrase is the section title where the two Quranic excerpts appear, without
comment or adornment. (The entire section consists of similar Quranic excerpts,
all of them equally chilling, and all of them without comment or adornment).
Consistent
with this, Izetbegovic affirmed in the same book that “It is not in fact
possible for there to be any peace or coexistence between ‘the Islamic
Religion’ and non-Islamic social and political institutions.”[34] He also asserted that Muslims were
required to take power by coup as soon as they were numerous enough to
succeed.
As far back
as 1983, Izetbegovic had been jailed by the government of Yugoslavia for
inciting Muslims against non-Muslims in Bosnia.[35] Izetbegovic re-released his book -- which was a call to
genocide -- as his election platform in the 1990 Bosnian elections, and
subsequently recreated the SS Handzar Division.
The
original Handzar was a terrorist army created out
of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim volunteers who committed genocide
against Serbs, Jews, and Roma (‘Gypsies’) in WWII, and launched by Hajj Amin
al Husseini, former Mufti of Jerusalem. Hajj Amin al Husseini was the father
of the so-called ‘Palestinian movement’ and the top leader, with Adolf
Eichmann, of the German Nazi Final Solution.[36]
Izetbegovic’s
resuscitated Handzar behaved precisely as the original, killing great numbers
of innocent Serbs (and the few Jews and Roma that could still be found) during
the 1990s. To learn about all this, read HIR’s three-part series:
The views
of Alija Izetbegovic, whom Western officials and the
mainstream mass media lionized left and right as a great ‘moderate,’ agree
perfectly with those of Ibn Hazm and the Ayatollah
Khomeini.
He is not
an isolated case.
Somebody
else who is sold by Western officials and the mainstream mass media as a
‘moderate Muslim’ is Mahmoud Abbas (a.k.a. ‘Abu Mazen’),
the current leader of Al Fatah and the PLO (Palestine Liberation
Organization). In a different piece I have analyzed the representation of
Mahmoud Abbas in the mass media,[37] and I will reproduce that analysis here.
I ran a
little test on September 20, 2005, that anybody with access to the
Lexis-Nexis Academic database can easily repeat.
First,
limiting myself to “major papers,” I asked the database to give me any
newspaper articles that mentioned the word ‘antisemite’
or ‘anti-Semite’ within ten words of ‘Abu Mazen,’
which is Mahmoud Abbas’s nickname. I got nothing. Zip. Then I tried the word
‘terrorist’ within ten words of ‘Abu Mazen.’ This
gave lots of results but when I started reading the articles I noticed that
the word ‘terrorist’ and the nickname ‘Abu Mazen’
usually did not even appear in the same sentence.[38] These articles were not saying that Abu Mazen
was a terrorist in the least. I was looking for something like, ‘the
terrorist Abu Mazen,’ ‘Abu Mazen,
the terrorist,’ ‘Abu Mazen, who is a terrorist’ --
anything like that. So I shortened the search to ‘Abu Mazen’
within 5 words of ‘terrorist.’ This time I got only 62 results, and as I
started reading the articles I found the same phenomenon: the word
‘terrorist’ would end one sentence and the name ‘Abu Mazen’
would begin the next, as in “...and ceasing the targeted killings of
suspected terrorist leaders. Abu Mazen may
represent Israel’s best chance...”[39] Or else these were sentences that explicitly alleged that Abu
Mazen was not a terrorist, as in “Sharon spokesman Raanan Gissin said: ‘Contrary
to Arafat, Abu Mazen is against terrorist
activity...’”[40]
So,
according to my test, nobody much seems to accuse Abu Mazen
(Mahmoud Abbas) of being a terrorist. That’s interesting because Fatah is one
of the world’s worst terrorist organizations, and “Abu Mazen
is... one of the founders of Fatah, one of the original Arafat band of
brothers.”[41] Moreover, Fatah is the controlling
organ in the PLO, and as early as 1992 the PLO made clear that Mahmoud Abbas
would be Yasser Arafat’s replacement.[42]
I tried one
more search. This time I asked the database for appearances of ‘Abu Mazen’ within ten words of ‘moderate.’ Now I got a grand
total of 121 results. Below I reproduce not a cherry-picked selection of
these but simply the first five in the chronologically ordered list. You will
notice an obvious -- and lightning quick -- progression.
1) 1992 (Financial Times). “Mr
[Mahmoud] Abbas, whose nom de guerre is Abu Mazen
and who is regarded as a moderate...”[43]
Notice the
words “who is regarded as.” They seem innocent, but they are not. If some
people regard Abbas as a moderate, it should matter to the reader who these
people are. Are these people sane or insane? Knowledgeable or ignorant? Impartial
or biased? All of these things can potentially be ascertained by the reader
if only the identities of those who supposedly consider Abbas a moderate are
not withheld. Why is the Financial Times leaving out this vital
information? The effect of this prose, at least, will be to make most
readers think that it is a scientific and/or widespread opinion that Abbas is
a moderate (and the first hypothesis for any behavior ought to be that its
actual effects were intended).
2) 1993 (Financial Times). “Mr
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the PLO moderate. . .”[44]
3) 1993 (Financial Times). “Mr
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)...a key moderate...”[45]
The views
at the Financial Times matured quickly in a consistent direction:
Abbas began as “a moderate” according to implied but unidentified multitudes,
and a year later became “the PLO moderate” (said in passing because it is
supposedly so obvious), and also “a key moderate.”
Could Abbas
become any more moderate? Yes he could.
4) 1994 (The Observer). “Abu Mazen,
the leading moderate in the PLO. . .”[46]
But with a
little effort, who’s to say that Abbas could not become an arch-moderate?
5) 1995 (The Guardian). “...the arch-moderate Abu Mazen...”[47]
This is now
the ceiling; by 1995, the propaganda had reached its final destination. Abbas
had become Gandhi, practically.
Now, here
is what ought to be terribly surprising to anybody who was taught by the
mainstream media, the US government, and the Israeli government, to think of
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as a moderate: After
Yasser Arafat died, the Fatah terrorists who publicly cried against ‘peace’
and promised to go on killing innocent Israelis were precisely those most
eager to see Mahmoud Abbas succeed Yasser Arafat as Fatah chief.
An Associated
Press wire dated 27 November 2004 reports that:
“. . .in the Balata refugee camp near the West Bank city of
Nablus, about 1,000 Palestinians -- including scores of armed, masked
militants affiliated with Fatah -- demonstrated for the continuation of the
uprising.
The demonstrators also declared their support for Mahmoud
Abbas, the new head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Fatah’s
candidate in Jan. 9 presidential elections.”[48]
The Al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade branch of Fatah was passionate, taking Abbas’s side
vociferously when it seemed like Marwan Barghouti,
another Fatah leader, might seek the post:
“Abbas already has been nominated as Fatah’s presidential
candidate, so Barghouti must run as an independent.
But as a leading Fatah member, he would likely undermine Abbas’ prospects. .
. Zakaria Zubeidi, the 29-year-old West Bank leader
of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a violent group linked to Fatah, said he
would back Abbas. ‘Barghouti. . .should resign from
Fatah,’ he told the Associated Press.”[49]
The Al Aqsa
Martyrs’ Brigades, as Newsday once explained, is “the deadliest
Palestinian militia,”[50] so what we see above is that the most
extreme Arab terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza are also the most
enthusiastic supporters of Mahmoud Abbas.
Why?
Because Mahmoud Abbas is an arch-moderate?
As we’ve
seen above, Abbas is one of the founders of Fatah. The big force behind the
creation of Fatah was the afore-mentioned Hajj Amin al Husseini, leader of
the German Nazi Final Solution.[51] He received the best anti-Jewish training in the world,
because Husseini supervised his training by German Nazis who
were in Cairo to improve Egypt's intelligence and military apparatus after
the defeat of 1948.[51a] And as historian Howard Sachar explains, “from the outset...
the Fatah’s reputation depended largely upon the success of its Moslem
traditionalist approach of jihad against Israel.”[52]
Mahmoud
Abbas is one of the authors of the strategy of promising ‘peace’ to the
Israelis in order to divide them and gain a better position from which to
exterminate them.[53] This strategy eventually became the
Oslo 'Peace' Process, and Abbas's importance to it may be gauged by the fact
that the Oslo process resulted from “secret talks conducted [by]...Shimon
Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister, and Abu Mazen
[Mahmoud Abbas].”[53a] It is Abbas's signature, not
Arafat's, that graces the agreement, and not coincidentally he is called the
"architect" of Oslo.[53b] The entire strategy follows Al Fatah's “Moslem traditionalist
approach of jihad,” because traditionally, from ancient times to the
present, Muslim clerics and scholars have defended, as we saw in the case of
Ibn Hazm's treatise on jihad, that it is
okay to lie to the infidel in order to destroy him. Western governments and
the mainstream media assist these lies when they represent Mahmoud Abbas as a
supposed "arch-moderate."
Given their
obvious ideology, if Alija Izetbegovic and Mahmoud
Abbas are the modern ‘moderate Muslims,’ then we have once again identified what
continues to be the center of gravity in the culture of Islam: terrorist war
against non-Muslims.
Do genuine ‘moderate Muslims’ exist? _________________________________
They do, in
fact.
For
example, in Part 2 and Part 3 of the above-mentioned HIR series on
Bosnia, you will learn that a majority of Muslims in Bosnia voted against Alija Izetbegovic and for the Bosnian Muslim candidate
who advocated peace with non-Muslims: Fikret Abdic. This was a very slim majority, however,
which helps explain why the moderate Bosnian Muslims did not succeed. In
fairness, though, the support for Izetbegovic coming from the NATO powers and
the Muslim states played a larger role.
Because a
majority of Muslims had voted for the moderate Fikret
Abdic, Alija Izetbegovic,
supported by NATO and the Muslim states, illegally seized power. When that
happened, some of Abdic’s supporters decided to
fight rather than be ruled by the racist Izetbegovic, and they liberated the
so-called ‘Bihac pocket,’ fighting also alongside the Bosnian Serbs to
preserve a peaceful, multiethnic Bosnia.
The details
of all this are in the above-mentioned HIR series on Bosnia, but consider
here just the following wire from Agence
France Presse, entitled “Bihac refugees defy Izetbegovic plea to return
home.” The Muslim refugees -- refugees from Izetbegovic’s slaughters against
dissenters within his community -- obviously did not trust his promises that
they would be given amnesty, and chose to go on fighting. I have placed the
key paragraph in italics.
[Agence France Presse
wire begins here]
Some 10,000 refugees from Bosnia’s breakaway Bihac enclave
remained entrenched here Saturday between Croatian army and rebel Serb
forces, ignoring appeals from Sarajevo authorities for them to return home.
Izetbegovic on Friday offered fresh guarantees for the
refugees’ safety if they returned from the UN-controlled neutral zone between
Croatian army lines and rebel Serb forces to the western enclave of Bihac,
the former stronghold of routed rebel Moslem leader Fikret
Abdic.
But there were no signs that the refugees, many wearing
military uniforms, were ready to go back to Bihac.
“We will only return home if (Bosnian President Alija) Izetbegovic’s army withdraws completely from the
Bihac pocket,” said one of the refugees, Dzenad Seferic. None of his fellow refugees nearby contradicted
his sentiments.
Seferic added that the refugees would stay
put until Bihac was “placed under the control of the UN Protection Force and
[Fikret] Abdic returns as
our head of state.”
Another refugee, Sefer Adic, 43, said he would rather die than return home.
“The world has not understood that Izetbegovic is an
assassin, a (Moslem) fundamentalist who represents a danger for the whole of
Europe,” he charged. “Of course we are Moslems. But we are moderates, not
like those in Sarajevo.”
The Bosnian president had asked European Union officials in
the zone Friday to assure the refugees that an amnesty for “soldiers and
civilians” in the enclave had been “extended indefinitely.”
Sarajevo said the amnesty covered Abdic’s
routed troops, provided they surrendered to government forces [i.e. to
Izetbegovic’s illegal government] within seven days.
Croatia has refused entry to the refugees, who fled Bihac
fearing reprisals after Abdic’s defeat last week by
the Bosnian government army [i.e. Izetbegovic’s illegal ‘government’ army,
made up significantly of foreign mujahedin terrorists sent by Iran (see
here)], and a dozen Croatian armored vehicles were deployed
Saturday to prevent them from moving beyond the UN-controlled zone.[54]
[Agence France Presse
wire begins here]
There were
lots of moderate Muslims in Bosnia, and, as we see above, they were concerned
about the impact of Izetbegovic’s terrorism on the rest of Europe: they cared
about their fellow human beings, even when these fellow humans were
non-Muslims.
What I wish
to impress upon you, however, is the position of a moderate Muslim in the
ideological context of Islamic culture. As far as orthodox Islam is
concerned, a moderate Muslim is a heretic, and there is precious
little support for his position in the Muslim texts. Thus, moderate Muslims
can easily be attacked by Muslim clerics and scholars such as Ibn Hazm and the Ayatollah Khomeini for deviating from what the
Qur’an demands: the slaughter of infidels. The position of ‘moderate Muslims’
within the culture of Islam is therefore quite fragile, because the trend
among Muslim clerics and scholars, taking their cue from the Qur’an, is to
preach terrorist war. The moderate Muslim who wishes to live in peace with
non-Muslims will thus be told that he is a traitor to Islam. You may think
the solution is simple: moderate Muslims, who are obviously uncomfortable
with their own religion, should convert to a different religion or become
atheists. But this, you see, is punishable by death: one has become an
infidel. And since Western governments turn out to be assisting Muslims who
advocate terrorism against infidels, it is obvious that moderate Muslims
cannot succeed.
From this
point of view, the spread of Islam must be understood as a danger to world
peace, notwithstanding the fact that moderate Muslims indeed exist.
But why do
Western leaders and the media completely misrepresent Islam as ‘the religion
of peace’? As you may recall, we began with quotes showing the president of
the United States, and the Catholic Pope, to be defending the view, to the
millions of Westerners whom they influence, that Islam is a religion of
peace. What is the problem, here?
That will be the subject of a future HIR
piece on the topic of Islam.
The next piece in this series is:
"Dhimmitude: The fates of non-Muslims in Islamic
society"; from THE CULTURE OF ISLAM; Historical and Investigative
Research; 9 September 2007; by Francisco Gil-White
http://www.hirhome.com/islam/culture02.htm
Footnotes
and Further Reading
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