This piece 
				defends and supports with evidence one hypothesis of what the 
				1991 Gulf War was really about: protecting Islamist 
				radicalism in Iran.
				This piece is 
				included in the present series to explain Bush Jr.'s current war on Iraq 
				because HIR believes that in order to understand the present we 
				must know the past. So, in order to 
				understand current US policy towards Iraq, I will argue, one must 
				understand what past US policy towards both Iraq and Iran has 
				been. Consider: before the 
				1991 Gulf War there was the Iran-Iraq war, during which we had 
				the Iran-Contra affair, the scandal of which revealed US policies 
				to be strengthening Iran 
				against Iraq. After the 1991 Gulf War, US policy was to 
				contain Iraq, which also had 
				the effect of strengthening Iran against Iraq. This makes it 
				unsurprising that the 1991 Gulf War, too, had the effect of 
				strengthening Iran against Iraq. Quite consistent. The first hypothesis for any policy ought to be that its 
				actual effects are intended, particularly when 
				policies producing identical effects are launched over and over 
				again, with numbing consistency. This first hypothesis is the 
				one that I will defend.
				
					
		
		
		___________________________________________________________
					
		
				
		
		Table of Contents
		( hyperlinked  
					< )
					
		
		
				
					
				<  
					 
Introduction
				
		
				
					
				<  
					 The 
				hypothesis: the US has a pro-Islamist,
				pro-terrorist policy.
				
		
				
					
				<  
					 The 
				suspicious prelude to the 1991 Gulf War:
				Khomeini, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Iran-Contra affair.
				
		
				
					
				<  
					 The 
				mastermind: Zalmay Khalilzad.
				
		
				
					
				<  
					 Iraq 
				was an obstacle to the US's pro-Islamist policy;
				hence, the Gulf War.
				
		
				
					
				<  
					 The 
				US ordered Kuwait to provoke Iraq.
				
		
				
					
				<  
					 The 
				hypothesis that the US attacked Iraq 'for oil' is absurd.
				
		
		
				___________________________________________________________
		
					
		
				
		
		
		Introduction
				I believe the US 
				has a pro-Iranian policy, by which I mean not a policy to help 
				ordinary Iranians, but a policy to support the Islamist 
				terrorists who run the country. My view will be surprising if you have 
				noticed at all the tradition of public invective between US and 
				Iranian officials. This loud trading of insults goes back to 
				1979, when the Shiite Muslim fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini 
				assumed power in Iran, after which large crowds of 
				Khomeini-backed Iranian students, having seized the US embassy 
				in Tehran and taken hostage its personnel, began chanting, fist 
				over head, Khomeini’s new name for the United States: “Great 
				Satan.” US government officials reciprocated with 
				counter-denunciations of the Iranian mullahs, calling them 
				“extremists” and “terrorists.” I was young but I remember 
				watching some of this on my TV set, in real time. It was 
				impressive. One really got the feeling of a great enmity between 
				the US and Iranian governments, and this impression has been 
				reinforced over the years by the mutual and repeated 
				denunciations of US and Iranian officials. Just recently, Bush 
				Jr. has included Iran in his ‘Axis of Evil.’ The only thing that 
				can possibly top that is “Great Satan,” but Khomeini used it 
				already.
				Should we infer 
				the structure of alliances from these mutual accusations?
				No. The people 
				who run countries routinely misrepresent what they are doing. 
				And politics doesn’t just make strange bedfellows; it can also 
				make bedfellows who merely pretend to be estranged. In 
				consequence, a scientist cannot proceed directly and 
				uncritically from official statements to a model of geopolitical 
				alliances, lest he become a propagandist. Any claim about how 
				the various forces are aligned requires a demonstration whose 
				logic and documentation others can check, and which makes 
				reference to the behaviors -- not the official statements 
				-- of governments.
				For this reason,
				
				the current threats to attack Iran over 
				its nuclear program should be taken with a big grain of salt.
				
		
		
		
				The hypothesis: the US has a pro-Islamist,
		pro-terrorist policy
		________________
				Since the 
				supposed enmity between the US and Iranian governments dates to 
				1979, it is significant that in 1979, as is relatively well 
				known, the US created and then sponsored throughout the 1980s a 
				‘holy warrior’ movement in Afghanistan. The point of this was to 
				attack the Soviet Union which had a border with Afghanistan. The man who invented this strategy, 
				Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
				has recently explained to Le Nouvel Observateur, proudly, 
				that the production of fanatical Muslim terrorists in 
				Afghanistan -- the mujahedin (or mujahideen), who went on to 
				become an international mercenary force -- was quite deliberate, 
				and meant to generate a conflict on the Soviet border (my emphasis, below):
				
				[Quote from Le Nouvel Observateur begins here]
				
				LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Former CIA director Robert Gates states 
				in his memoirs: The American secret services began, six months 
				before the Soviet intervention, to support the Mujahideen [in 
				Afghanistan]. At that time you were president Carter’s security 
				advisor; thus you played a key role in this affair. Do you 
				confirm this statement?
				
				ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Yes. According to the official version, the 
				CIA's support for the Mujahideen began in 1980, i.e. after the 
				Soviet army's invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979. 
				But the reality, which was kept secret until today, is 
				completely different: Actually it was on 3 July 1979 that 
				president Carter signed the first directive for the secret 
				support of the opposition against the pro-Soviet regime in 
				Kabul. And on the same day I wrote a note, in which I 
				explained to the president that this support would in my opinion 
				lead to a military intervention by the Soviets.[1]
				
		
				
				[Quote ends here]
				It appears that 
				the interviewer was a bit shocked, for he asked:
				[Back 
				to Le Nouvel Observateur]
				
				LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: ...don't you regret having helped future 
				terrorists, having given them weapons and advice?
				
				ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: What is most important for world history? 
				The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? Some Islamic 
				hotheads or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the 
				cold war? 
				
				LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "Some hotheads?" But it has been said 
				time and time again: today Islamic fundamentalism represents a 
				world-wide threat... 
				
				ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Rubbish![1]
				[Quote ends here]
				It has been said 
				that what Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Robert Gates were trying to do was give the Soviet 
				Union its Viet Nam: a withering conflict it could not win. The 
				comparison, however, has a few problems. The US wanted 
				the war on Viet Nam; the Soviets, by contrast, didn't ask for an 
				Islamist terrorist disaster on their border -- it came courtesy 
				of the United States. The masses of Vietnamese supported the 
				people whom the US fought; the Afghan movement, by contrast, was 
				manufactured from the outside, by the US. Finally, Viet Nam is 
				far away from the US whereas Afghanistan is smack against the 
				former Soviet Union. What is undeniable is that the US ruling 
				elite succeeded in producing a conflict on the Soviet border 
				that the Soviets could not win. Moreover, this Islamist terrorist 
				movement would grow and feed the growth of other such movements 
				in Central Asia and the Middle East.
				Jimmy Carter and 
				Zbigniew Brzezinski also began at this time a secret buildup of 
				Saudi Arabia's military, which Reagan also continued, and which 
				made this country, according to Frontline (PBS), 
				“ultimately...the largest beneficiary of U.S. weapons sales in 
				the entire world” and “one of the most heavily armed countries 
				in the world.”
[2]
				Frontline says lots of interesting things. For example, that 
				“years before Desert Storm [i.e. the 1991 Gulf War] 
				billion-dollar state-of-the-art military bases were already in 
				place [in Saudi Arabia], built to U.S. military specifications, 
				ready and waiting for the arrival of American soldiers.” Now, 
				Saudi Arabia is an Islamist theocracy, and in addition spends 
				millions of its oil dollars every year sponsoring Islamist 
				terrorism and antisemitic agitation all over the world. If the 
				US both allies with and arms this country to the teeth, then it 
				is allied with its antisemitic Islamist and terrorist policy. 
				When did this begin? Frontline says: “The story of the Saudi 
				military build-up begins...during the last days of the Shah of 
				Iran.” In other words, Jimmy Carter began the extreme military 
				buildup of Saudi Arabia right around the time that the Ayatollah 
				Khomeini came to power, because Khomeini is who replaced the shah.
				So we’ve got that 
				the US began serious sponsorship of Islamist terrorism in 
				Afghanistan in 1979. It was also in 1979 that the US began seriously arming the 
				Saudi Arabian Islamist terrorists. And look: the Ayatollah 
				Khomeini, an Islamist terrorist, came to power in Iran in...1979.
				A trifecta?
				Yes, assuming 
				that the 
				Ayatollah Khomeini was a US asset. From the above context, this hypothesis 
				should at least be put on the table.
				Jared Israel from
				Emperor’s Clothes has argued 
				for some time -- and has carefully documented -- that the US 
				ruling elite actively promotes Islamist terrorism in Asia 
				because it destabilizes the big Asian countries -- Russia, 
				China, and India -- that compete with the US for geopolitical 
				influence. This strategy works, he says, because these countries have 
				Muslim populations on both sides of their borders.
[3]
				According to Jared Israel, the promotion of Islamist terrorism 
				is no mere side effect of US foreign policy, but its main goal.
				Is he right?
				As we have seen 
				above, the US ruling elite has already confessed that Jared 
				Israel is right in the case of Afghanistan. To see whether he is 
				right in general, we can put his 
				hypothesis to the test. There is no better test than to 
				look at US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq, for Jared Israel’s hypothesis 
				here will either produce absurdities 
				at every turn, or else it will tend to explain everything. Why? 
				Because the contest between these two states was always 
				perceived to be decisive for the success or failure of 
				theocratic Islamism in the Middle East. As Milton Viorst puts it:
				
				“At stake was whether the secular [but still ruthless] Baathism 
				of Saddam or the radical [Muslim fundamentalist] Shiism of 
				Khomeini would prevail in Iraq, and perhaps in the Middle East.”
[4]
				
		
				With stakes like 
				these, Jared Israel’s hypothesis of a pro-Islamist US foreign 
				policy requires, for example, that the outcome of the 
				Iran-Iraq war was not good for the US ruling elite, because,
				
				“in August 1988 Iran’s deteriorating economy and recent Iraqi 
				gains on the battlefield compelled Iran to accept a United 
				Nations-mediated cease-fire that it had previously resisted.”
[5]
				
		
				As Jared Israel 
				himself has pointed out, his hypothesis here predicted that the 
				United States would do something dramatic to re-strengthen Iran 
				relative to Iraq, and look: just three years later, in 1991, 
				the US launched the Gulf War against Iraq.
[6]
				What I will show in this piece is that Jared Israel’s hypothesis 
				can account for every little detail of the Gulf War of 1991, 
				including its prelude and aftermath.
				The point of this 
				series of articles is to provide the historical background 
				necessary to a proper understanding of Bush Jr.’s current war on 
				Iraq. I have argued in the
				
				General Introduction that the 
				point of Bush Jr.’s war is to chew up Iraq, making it soft for 
				Iran to swallow.[6a]
					Certainly, the consequence of Bush Jr.'s attack plus 
				withdrawal will be that Iran will swallow up Iraq, as I also 
				argue in that piece. This will be portrayed by US officials as 
				an ‘unfortunate’ and ‘unintended’ consequence. But it would be 
				remarkable for the US to manage accidentally the result 
				it has clearly been working very hard to produce since 1979. 
				What I aim to show is that the result of the US invasion of Iraq 
				-- strengthening Iran -- will be consistent with a long string 
				of major US foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East.
				Our present focus 
				is the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq which, as I will show, was 
				explicitly meant by US policy planners to weaken Iraq and 
				make Iran in consequence relatively stronger. This is indeed 
				what the war achieved. But since US foreign policy in the 
				prelude to the Gulf War was also perfectly consistent with 
				the view that the US favors the Iranian Islamists, I will begin 
				by taking a look at this prelude, the better to understand the Gulf War 
				itself.
				
		
		
		
				The suspicious prelude to the 1991 Gulf War:
				Khomeini, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Iran-Contra affair
				______________________________________________
				After taking 
				power in 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini immediately provoked a war 
				with Iraq. The Washington Post wrote that “...after [Khomeini] 
				returned to Iran in triumph in February 1979 he set about 
				encouraging Iraqi Shiites -- who make up about half that 
				country’s 13 million population -- to rise against their Sunni 
				Moslem leaders.”
[7]
				But that’s not all Khomeini did. Milton Viorst gives a more 
				complete account:
				
				“In January 1979, the ayatollah Khomeini had returned in triumph 
				to Iran after fifteen years in exile. Iraq promptly recognized 
				the new regime and extended friendly overtures, but Khomeini was 
				not impressed. He blamed Saddam personally for his expulsion 
				from An Najaf [in Iraq, where he had been living in exile] and 
				left no doubt that he regarded Saddam’s state not just as 
				anti-Shiite but as anti-Islamic, heretical and illegitimate. …As 
				early as the summer of 1979, Khomeini repudiated the 1975 treaty 
				between the shah and Iraq in which the two states pledged 
				noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. He proceeded 
				to supply arms to Kurdish guerrillas fighting Baathi rule in the 
				north, and in An Najaf he financed the Shiite leader Ayatollah 
				Baqir al-Sadr, who provoked disorders to the end of replacing 
				the Baathis with a fundamentalist theocracy.”
[8]
				
		
				Now, under the 
				official hypothesis that he was the enemy of the US ruling 
				elite, Khomeini’s immediate provocation of a war with Iraq is 
				difficult to explain. You see, the previous autocratic and 
				repressive dictator 
				of Iran, the Shah (King) Reza Pahlavi, had been a total US 
				puppet (installed in power in a 1953 CIA coup, 
				
				about which more 
				in a forthcoming piece), and in consequence most of the military 
				equipment of the Iranian armed forces was American-made. As a 
				result of the fact that the Iranian revolution had involved some 
				fighting, “Iran at that time was in dire need of arms and spare 
				parts for its American-made arsenal.”
[9]
				And yet Khomeini went out of his way to engage in dramatic 
				anti-American provocations at the same time that he picked a 
				fight with Iraq. For example, Khomeini seized the US embassy in 
				Iran and took its personnel hostage.
				An absurdity? 
				On the face of it, certainly. If Khomeini needed US spare parts for its military, then 
				how could he afford to attack Iraq and the US simultaneously?
				But the absurdity 
				can be resolved if you posit that in reality the US ruling elite 
				and Khomeini were never enemies. In this view, like his 
				predecessor the shah, Khomeini was a US asset, 
				
				and his 
				‘provocations’ were part of a US-driven political theater for 
				the unsuspecting global audience, there to generate certain 
				appearances that the US ruling elite found useful for its 
				geopolitical game.[9a] What this view requires is that Khomeini 
				would get his money and spare parts from the US quite despite 
				his apparent provocations.
				And he did.
				The Washington 
				Post claimed in 1980 that “the seizure of the American hostages 
				has deprived Iran’s military of much-needed U.S. and European 
				spare parts for its almost entirely imported military 
				equipment.”
[10]
				But this was false. The ‘hostage crisis’ did not deprive 
				Khomeini of anything. On the contrary. The United States 
				government offered to pay billions of dollars in exchange for 
				the release of the hostages, which Iran accepted (the final sum 
				was close to $8 billion).[11]
				And throughout the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, Iran received 
				secret shipments of US weapons, which became a great 
				embarrassment to the Reagan administration when this became 
				known in 1986 (this was called, alternately, ‘Iran-gate’ and the 
				‘Iran-Contra scandal’). US officials claimed when caught that 
				the arms shipments had the purpose of getting Iran to lean on 
				the Hezbollah terrorists it has always patronized in Lebanon, 
				who at the time had taken some other Americans hostage. 
				The media was quick to make this explanation seem credible. For 
				example, the Washington Post told its readers late in 1986 that, 
				“according to informed sources” (in other words, according to 
				alleged sources that nobody could check), “an Iranian 
				government emissary told U.S. representatives he would arrange 
				for the release of an American hostage held in Lebanon if the 
				United States would sell Iran 500 TOW antitank missiles.
”[11a]
				But this explanation was absurd. History’s greatest power does not 
				arm to the teeth a fifth-rate power so it can grovel for its 
				influence on a tiny terrorist organization in third 
				country, and maybe get some hostages released.
				In any case, 
				it couldn’t be true even in principle. Limited 
				congressional investigations into the relationship between 
				Reagan and Khomeini brought to light in 1991, as the New York Times 
				reported later, that:
				
				“Soon after taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration 
				secretly and abruptly changed United States policy and allowed 
				Israel to sell several billion dollars’ worth of American-made 
				arms, spare parts and ammunition to the Iranian Government. . .
				
				. . .The change in policy came before the Iranian-sponsored 
				seizure of American hostages in Lebanon began in 1982. . .” 
				[my emphasis] [12]
				
				So the 
				US had the Israelis sell “several billion dollars’ worth” in 
				arms secretly to the nearby Iranians; meanwhile, explains the NYT, 
				“The Reagan Administration continued to replenish Israel’s 
				stockpile of American-made weapons.” But the key point is this: 
				if the US policy 
				to send US armament to Iran began before the hostages 
				were taken in Lebanon, then arming Iran had nothing to do with 
				buying the freedom of these hostages. The NYT pretends that, 
				since it didn't, “No 
				American rationale for permitting covert arms sales to Iran 
				could be established.” But this is false. Such a rationale
				could be 
				established, it’s just that the New York Times is not allowed to 
				say it: the US had a policy to sponsor the growth of Islamist 
				terrorism, which is precisely why the US program through Israel “was 
				overtaken by the [direct US] arms shipments to Iran,” as the same NYT article states.
				The NYT says that, 
				in deciding to arm the Iranian Islamists, “the [incoming] Reagan Administration secretly and abruptly 
				changed United States policy.” Is that so? I would argue that 
				there was no abrupt change whatsoever. Consider what happened in 
				the case of the hostages that were taken in the American embassy 
				in Tehran, a crisis that began in the Carter presidency: “Carter, as President,” 
				as the same article explains, “offer[ed] to accept an Iranian 
				request and release embargoed Iranian military goods worth about 
				$150 million -- if the hostages were freed.” Compare that to the 
				$5.5. billion that Reagan offered and delivered to the Iranians 
				in exchange for the same embassy hostages. And as I show
				
				in the previous piece in this series, 
				it is hard to make sense of what happened in the embassy 
				‘hostage crisis’ unless we assume that Jimmy Carter was running 
				that show in order to raise the prestige of both the Iranian 
				Islamists and the PLO.[13]
				Reagan’s policies -- including his policies towards the PLO -- 
				were Carter’s.[14]
				
				There was no abrupt change.
				Now, since the 
				arms shipments to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war at first went through Israel, and given that Iran's 
				new Islamist government 
				was loudly calling for the destruction of Israel, one may ask: 
				What was the Israeli government thinking? The New York Times 
				argues that Israel wanted Iraq and Iran mutually weakened, and 
				tries to make it seem as if Israel had an independent foreign 
				policy on this question. And yet the NYT also states all of the 
				following about the supposedly ‘Israeli’ program:
				
				1) that “Chartered aircraft from Argentina, Ireland and the 
				United States were used to fly American-made arms to Israel 
				and, in some cases, directly to Teheran”;
				
				2) that these “chartered flights carrying American arms for Iran 
				originated from a covert air base near Tucson, Ariz., known as 
				Marana Air Park”;
				
				3) that “For years, the Central Intelligence Agency has used 
				Marana for secret arms shipments”;
				
				4) that there was a continuous “flow of spare parts and other 
				equipment for Iran’s F-14 fleet” and that these “sensitive 
				items, whose exports are closely monitored by American 
				officials, were transferred from United States stockpiles to 
				Israel, which has no F-14’s”; and finally
				
				5) that “Former Israeli officials said the 1981 agreement with 
				[Secretary of State Alexander M.] Haig was coordinated by Robert 
				C. McFarlane, who was then the State Department counselor.” 
				[NOTE: By 1994, three years after the NYT article, Milton Viorst 
				was writing like this: “Subsequently, it was revealed 
				that...Alexander Haig, first authorized...arms to Iran in 1981.”[15]]
				I think the most 
				reasonable interpretation is that the US was deciding Israel’s 
				foreign policy to Israel’s detriment, as it often has. This is 
				certainly suggested by the fact that, as the NYT also states, it was “Israeli Defense 
				Minister Ariel Sharon [who] was selling [the] American-made 
				military materiel” to the Iranians who were calling for 
				the destruction of Israel. Ariel Sharon is the man now selling Israel 
				out by allowing unrepentant antisemitic terrorists to take 
				complete control over Gaza and the Gaza-Egypt border, according 
				to the wishes of the United States foreign policy elite.
				When did the 
				secret arms shipments to Iran cease? Who knows if they ever did. 
				But Milton Viorst states that “Subsequently, it was revealed 
				that...the [arms] shipments went on without significant 
				interruption until the end of the Iraq-Iran war.”[16]
				Depending on whether this means the cease-fire in 1988, or else 
				the official ending of the war in 1990, the US shipped arms to 
				the Iranians for at least two or four years after the Iran-gate 
				scandal first began making headlines in late 1986! The public 
				scandal, president Reagan’s public apology, the investigations, 
				etc., were all supposed to have put an end to the arms sales. 
				But according to Viorst they continued.
				How can anybody 
				argue that these arms sales had anything to do with freeing 
				hostages in Lebanon?
				The bulk of the 
				evidence suggests, on the contrary, that the US ruling elite 
				perceived a geopolitical benefit to itself in strengthening the 
				Iranian Islamists, and that Khomeini was always a US asset. From 
				this point of view the US pulled off a masterstroke, because, 
				although the Soviets were obviously not happy with Khomeini’s 
				Islamism, they preferred anything to a US puppet on their 
				border. Thus, by replacing the shah with Khomeini, who gave a 
				convincing theatrical performance as a savage enemy of the 
				United States, the US switched to a policy of destabilizing its 
				Soviet rival with Islamist terrorism while appearing to fight 
				the very ideology it was sponsoring. Brilliant.
				So what happened
				immediately before the Iran-Iraq war, and what happened
				during the Iran-Iraq war, is consistent with Jared 
				Israel's hypothesis that the US ruling elite sponsors the 
				Iranian Islamists. What happened after the Iran-Iraq war, 
				and leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, which is our ultimate goal, 
				is also consistent, as I now show.
				
		
		
		
				The mastermind: Zalmay Khalilzad
				______________________________
				To follow the 
				career of Zalmay Khalilzad is to see the US policy at work, 
				because he has been one of its main architects. Consider the 
				following chronology of events:
				
				1988
				Iran, badly 
				beaten by the Iran-Iraq war, and considerably worse off than 
				Iraq, agrees to a cease-fire. Zalmay Khalilzad, at the time “an 
				official in the [US State Department’s] office of Policy 
				Planning” writes a briefing paper for incoming president Bush 
				Sr., in which he calls for “strengthening Iran and containing 
				Iraq.”[17]
				
		
				
				1989
				Zalmay Khalilzad, 
				in a Los Angeles Times article entitled “Iran Future As A 
				Pawn Or A Gulf Power,” frets out loud that,
				
				“The Iraqis devastated the Iranians toward the end of the war, 
				capturing as much as half of the Iranian tanks, armor and 
				artillery. Iraqi successes forced Iran to accept a cease-fire 
				that Khomeini compared to drinking a ‘poisoned chalice.’ Iraq is 
				now militarily dominant, with 45 battle-tested divisions against 
				Iran’s 12, with even larger ratios of strength in tanks and 
				aircraft. Tehran is looking for ways to overcome strategic 
				inferiority and gain a degree of protection against Iraq.
				
				…A further weakened Iran would not increase stability but would 
				increase Iraqi preeminence in the Gulf and make Iran more 
				vulnerable to Soviet influence.”
[18]
				
		
				Clearly, 
				Khalilzad preferred that Iran become a Gulf power, not a pawn. 
				And he obviously didn’t like Iraq being strong relative to Iran.
				
				1990
				“Zalmay Khalilzad 
				[becomes] assistant under secretary of defense for policy 
				planning...” a post that he will hold until 1992.
[19]
				This captures 1991, the year that the US launched the Gulf War 
				against Iraq.
				
				1991 - The Gulf War
				The US destroys 
				Iraq’s military and civilian infrastructure, thereafter imposing 
				such harsh sanctions that 500,000 children die (more than died 
				in Hiroshima).
[20]
				This was completely out of proportion to Iraq’s offense 
				(attacking the despotic Kuwaiti monarchy), even if one accepts 
				the official story of how that happened. But what did this all 
				amount to, geopolitically? The US was “strengthening Iran and 
				containing Iraq,” precisely as Khalilzad had advised.
				
				1992
				In a Washington 
				Post editorial entitled "Arm the Bosnians," Zalmay Khalilzad argues (from his new perch at Rand Corp.) that the Bosnian 
				Muslims should be armed, and that the Afghan strategy -- relying 
				on Islamic states to arm and train terrorist 'holy warriors' -- should be followed.
[21]
				The US did precisely this. As an investigation by the government 
				of the Netherlands established, Pentagon military intelligence 
				coordinated with Iran the importation of thousands of 
				foreign mujahideen ('holy warrior') mercenaries into Bosnia.[22] 
				These soldiers fought for the Bosnian Islamist and terrorist 
				Alija Izetbegovic, whose policy was genocide.
[22a]
				
				2003
				Iran cooperated closely with 
				the US invasion of Iraq 
				(while directing the usual public invective at the US to 
				distract the issue); and the US took military action, while 
				invading Iraq, to strengthen the Iranian regime.[23]
				The man in charge of US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is, 
				guess who? That’s right: Zalmay Khalilzad.[24]
				
		
				
				2005
				Zalmay Khalilzad, now US 
				ambassador to Iraq, calls for “a withdrawal of American forces 
				next year”
[25]
				even as he observes that Iran is “advancing its long-term goal 
				of establishing [regional] domination.”[26]
				
		
				
				Do you see above anything inconsistent with a pro-Iranian 
				policy? Me neither.
				I point out that 
				“Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s national-security 
				adviser...was Khalilzad’s mentor when they were both on the 
				faculty at Columbia [University].”
[27]
				Zbigniew Brzezinski, as we saw earlier, is who invented the US’s 
				policy of supporting Islamist terrorism in Afghanistan in 1979, 
				and also the policy of arming Saudi Arabia to the teeth. So the 
				argument that the US does 
				not have a general policy to sponsor Islamist terrorism in Asia 
				is becoming...awkward. 
				Moreover, it is worth pointing out that if sponsoring Islamist 
				terrorism in Asia has indeed been the US’s policy, then Iraq has been an 
				obstacle to it, because it has been a secular state, and an 
				influential regional power. So perhaps the 
				Gulf War -- like Bush Jr.’s current war against Iraq -- can be 
				explained as the US removing a thorn on the side of its 
				pro-Islamist strategy.
				I turn to this 
				next.
				
		
		
		
				Iraq was an obstacle to the US's pro-Islamist policy;
				hence, the Gulf War.
				__________________
				Let’s go back 
				again to the year 1988. I remind you that, after 8 long years of 
				devastating war between Iran and Iraq, this is what happened:
				
				“in August 1988 Iran’s deteriorating economy and recent Iraqi 
				gains on the battlefield compelled Iran to accept a United 
				Nations-mediated cease-fire that it had previously resisted.”
[28]
				
		
				That same year, 
				General Norman Schwarzkopf, who was to wage the Gulf War just 
				three years later in 1991, was appointed to head the United 
				States Central Command, or Centcom. What is Centcom?
				
				“Centcom’s commander…is the overseer of all United States 
				military activities in 19 countries of the Middle East, Africa 
				and the Persian Gulf.”
[29]
				
		
				Milton Viorst 
				writes that, upon assuming command, 
				
				“Schwarzkopf transformed the Central Command, which had been 
				established in 1983 to counter a Soviet threat, to confront the 
				Iraqis, who he believed had become the real enemy in the 
				region.”
[30]
				
		
				Does it strike 
				you as strange that the US should have transformed Centcom in 
				1988 to target Iraq? After all, Centcom is a very big 
				deal, as you can see above, and the Soviet Union still existed. 
				Moreover, Centcom “had been established...to counter a Soviet 
				threat.” Ah, yes, but a Soviet threat to whom? To answer 
				this question is to dispel the mystery of why Iraq became 
				Centcom’s new target.
				As the New York 
				Times explained, also in 1988,
				
				“The origins of the Central Command go back to 1979 when the 
				Shah of Iran was overthrown and his country was in turmoil as a 
				result of the Islamic revolution…
				
				To provide a military capability to back up President [Carter's] 
				policy in the Gulf, [in 1980] a command designated the Rapid 
				Deployment Joint Task Force, which was to be a precursor of 
				Centcom, was formed.
				
				Paul X. Kelley…[its] first commander…was told to draw up plans 
				to defend Iran against a Soviet invasion…”
[31]
				
		
				It is perfectly 
				clear from the above that the US created Centcom explicitly to 
				defend Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamist Iran, immediately 
				after Khomeini came to power, in 1979. Isn’t this consistent 
				with the view that the Ayatollah Khomeini was always a US asset? 
				And what else is consistent with this view? Why, that Iraq 
				should have become Centcom’s new target in 1988, because 
				in that year Iran lost the war with Iraq and was left vulnerable 
				to its neighbor, as we saw.
				What was at stake 
				in the Iran-Iraq war? I remind you:
				
				“At stake [in the Iran-Iraq war] was whether the secular [but 
				still ruthless] Baathism of Saddam or the radical [Islamist] 
				Shiism of Khomeini would prevail in Iraq, and perhaps in the 
				Middle East.”
[32]
				
		
				If that’s what’s 
				at stake, then support for Iran, since 1979, meant support for 
				Islamism as the main force that would prevail in the Middle 
				East. When the US re-oriented Centcom to protect Iran from Iraq, 
				therefore, it was protecting the growth of Islamism. And when the US destroyed Iraq in the Gulf War, it 
				was doing the same.
				Some have claimed (including the general 
				himself) that Norman Schwarzkopf came up with the idea of 
				reorienting Centcom against Iraq, but he was just following 
				orders.
[33]
				Schwarzkopf was responsible, however, for implementing 
				this policy, and he also directed the Gulf War against Iraq. He 
				obviously has many uses, because it was also Norman Shwarzkopf who did the preparatory 
				diplomacy for this war.
				I turn to this 
				next.
				
		
		
		
				The US ordered Kuwait to provoke Iraq
				__________________________________
				According to the 
				London Times,
				
				“When Schwarzkopf moved to Central Command [Centcom] in 1988, he 
				quickly immersed himself in Arab culture and customs. He wore 
				Arab dress to a dinner with Kuwaiti officers. He embarked on a 
				round of diplomacy in Arab capitals.”
[34]
				
		
				Diplomacy for 
				what?
				As it turns out, 
				to convince the countries of the Gulf that they should now view 
				Iraq as their enemy. This took some work, because these Gulf 
				states had just financed Iraq’s war effort against Iran 
				precisely because, to them, it was the Iranian Shia 
				fundamentalists who posed the real threat, not the Iraqis. 
				Kuwait, especially, was worried about the Iranians because it 
				has a large Shiite minority.
[35]
				
		
				The Houston 
				Chronicle explained:
				
				“[Schwarzkopf] believed that Iraq's victory over Iran had 
				altered the balance of power in the Persian Gulf… [But] King 
				Hussein of Jordan counseled Schwarzkopf: ‘Don't worry about the 
				Iraqis. They are war-weary and have no aggressive intentions 
				against their Arab brothers.’ Even King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and 
				Sultan Qaboos Bin Said of Oman, who disdained Saddam as a thug, 
				were not alarmed by him.”
[36]
				
		
				But according to 
				Milton Viorst, Schwarzkopf was relentless:
				
				“Schwarzkopf was here on visits before the war, maybe a few 
				times a year,” an American diplomat in Kuwait told me after the 
				liberation. “He was a political general, which was in itself 
				unusual. He kept a personally high profile, and was on a 
				first-name basis with all the key ministers. He had good 
				political instincts, and though there were no agreements or 
				commitments, when the invasion occurred he already had the ties 
				that he thought he needed. The Kuwaitis feared that when they 
				called, we wouldn’t come. Schwarzkopf insisted -- explicitly or 
				not -- that we would…”
				
				Schwarzkopf acknowledges that he toured the Gulf giving out 
				warnings on Iraq… [He] does not challenge the legitimacy of 
				Saddam’s concerns over money and the islands, but defines his 
				own mission as one of persuading the Gulf Arabs that Iraq had 
				superseded Iran as their chief threat.
[37]
				
		
				How interesting… 
				Schwarzkopf himself recognizes that Iraq had legitimate concerns 
				“over money and the islands.” We shall get to those.
				But notice that 
				the general “defines his own mission as one of persuading the 
				Gulf Arabs that Iraq had superseded Iran as their chief threat.” 
				His mission was therefore not to warn the Gulf Arabs of a 
				real danger, but to persuade them to believe in a 
				particular, supposed danger. If the danger had been real, there 
				would have been absolutely no need for Schwarzkopf to convince 
				anybody in the Gulf, because Gulf states would have been much 
				more aware of this danger than Schwarzkopf. What Schwarzkopf’s 
				repeated cajoling and arm-twisting in the Gulf suggests, 
				therefore, is that he was making clear to the client states of 
				the US in the Gulf how seriously the United States wanted 
				them to assume this position: that Iraq was now The Enemy.
				What followed is 
				consistent with this analysis. After Norman Schwarzkopf went 
				around the Gulf whispering that Iraq was a big threat, Kuwait, the state that got the most ‘warnings’ from 
				Schwarzkopf about how dangerous Iraq supposedly was, went quite 
				-- quite -- out of its way to pick a fight with Iraq. But Kuwait was small and utterly defenseless 
				relative to Iraq (as the Iraqi attack proved). Hadn't 
				Schwarzkopf just told the Kuwaitis to be careful because Iraq 
				was now the Big Threat?
				Put yourself back 
				in high school, and imagine that you sit right behind the class 
				wimp. Someone comes over to him and whispers in his ear that the 
				class bully hates his guts and is out to get him. Other things 
				are said but you don’t manage to hear it all. What do you 
				predict? That the wimp will run and hide, perhaps. That would be 
				a reasonable prediction. If the class wimp instead gets up and 
				calls the bully names, spitting in his face for good measure, 
				you would likely be shocked. But suppose there was some evidence 
				to suggest that the wimp’s disrespect was deliberately timed so 
				that the minute the class bully gets going with him the teacher 
				walks in on them, and the bully is thrown out of school. What 
				would your hypothesis be now? You didn’t hear everything that 
				was whispered in the prelude to the fight, but you would be foolish not to suspect that what 
				you saw was a piece of theater to ‘get’ the class bully, 
				especially if the class wimp was unable to wipe a devilish grin 
				from his face. The wimp was bait. You might infer all 
				this even if you had missed the whispering part, but if you saw 
				the whispers before the action took place the case would be all 
				but closed.
				I will now give 
				you a close up of Norman Schwarzkopf’s whispers to the Kuwaitis, 
				and of the puzzlement they caused in the region. Then I will 
				show you the Kuwaitis having trouble wiping off a devilish 
				grin.
				The following 
				excerpt, from Milton Viorst, summarizes what happened, and also 
				makes an interesting reference to those Iraqi concerns “over 
				money and the islands” that even Schwarzkopf, the man who bombed 
				and overran Iraq, recognized were legitimate: 
				
				[Excerpt from Milton Viorst begins here]
				
				“Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan first brought...to my 
				attention...[that]… the evidence suggested collusion -- 
				deliberate or inadvertent -- between the United States and 
				Kuwait during the previous spring and summer [leading up to the 
				Gulf War]...
				
				The Prince noted that the entire Arab world had been bewildered 
				by Kuwait’s defiant behavior toward Iraq over the course of 
				their disputes in early 1990. The squabbling began with Kuwait’s 
				overproduction of oil, which coincided with a fall in the world 
				price far below the target set by OPEC (Organization of 
				Petroleum Exporting Countries). Oil economists pointed out that, 
				as a country of a half-million citizens, with foreign 
				investments that generated a huge income, Kuwait could afford a 
				major price drop... Iraq, a country of seventeen million, was, 
				by contrast, deeply in debt from eight years of war and 
				desperately short of cash for reconstruction. Though Kuwait’s 
				policy might make economic sense, the prince said, governments 
				do not normally make decisions without considering their 
				political consequences, and certainly no responsible regime 
				could fail to take into account the disparity in military power 
				that existed between Iraq and Kuwait.
				
				What was the explanation...? Kuwait’s oil policy severely 
				weakened Iraq.
				
				...The Iraqis were transforming Um-Qasr, a fishing village on 
				its narrow Gulf coastline, into a major naval facility. ...Um-Qasr 
				needed only Bubiyan and Warba, uninhabited Kuwaiti islands at 
				the mouth of the port, for its security. The Iraqis asked Kuwait 
				either to cede the islands or to lease them, but Kuwait refused 
				any agreement at all. Meanwhile, with Soviet power slipping 
				rapidly, Washington could, for the first time since Britain’s 
				departure, contemplate keeping a permanent fleet in the Gulf. 
				Many Arabs wondered whether Kuwait’s hard line on the islands 
				was meant to assure American naval supremacy in the Gulf.
				
				During the negotiations in early 1990, in fact, Kuwait offered 
				concessions on nothing, including division of the Rumaila oil 
				fields on its boundary with Iraq, a dispute dating back to 
				colonial times. What is more, Kuwait raised the ante by 
				demanding repayment with interest of loans it had made to Iraq 
				during the war, loans which Iraq had assumed would be forgiven 
				[because Iraq had been fighting a war with Shia Islamist Iran 
				and one of the main beneficiaries of the Iraqi victory was 
				the Kuwaiti ruling class, which was very worried about its own large Shia minority, as discussed above]. 
				Iraq’s answer was to demand compensation for some $2.5 billion 
				in oil that it accused Kuwait of stealing by slant drilling into 
				its Rumaila wells. To make matters worse, the Kuwaitis were said 
				to have twice offended Iraq by sending home emissaries who had 
				come for prearranged meetings with the emir. Even disregarding 
				the snub, most Arabs agreed that Kuwait was being imprudent.
				
				‘We couldn’t put together the pieces of the mosaic,’ said an 
				advisor to Prince Hassan, ‘but we were suspicious. The Kuwaitis 
				were very cocky. They told us officially that the United States 
				would intervene. We don’t know where they got that impression, 
				from the United States itself or from another party, like the 
				British or the Saudis. But they said they knew what they were 
				doing. They seemed to think they were safe.’”
[38]
				
		
				[Excerpt from Milton Viorst ends here]
		
				Now, if “[General 
				Norman] Schwarzkopf was [in Kuwait] on visits before the war, 
				maybe a few times a year,” as an American diplomat told Milton 
				Viorst, then it is naturally from Schwarzkopf that the 
				Kuwaitis got the impression that America would protect them.
				Naturally, 
				Kuwaiti officials will not say in public, “Yes, we are an 
				American puppet, and we were told to provoke Iraq with a promise 
				of American military support, so we did as we were told.” But 
				precisely because they can’t, it is interesting that what they
				have said in public comes as close as possible to being 
				such an admission without actually saying it outright.
				Sheikh Ali al 
				Khalifa, former Kuwaiti minister of oil, at first “denied that 
				Kuwait, in negotiating with Iraq, was influenced by the prospect 
				of American military support…” He gave Milton Viorst the Kuwaiti 
				party line, accusing Saddam Hussein of everything under the sun. 
				But then he concluded with this stunning admission, which Viorst 
				himself puts in italics:
				
				“But the American policy was clear... We understood it but 
				Saddam didn’t. We knew the United States would not let us be 
				overrun.”
[39]
				
		
				Sheikh Salem, the 
				Kuwaiti foreign minister, explained to Viorst that, although the 
				US did not put it down explicitly on paper, the understanding 
				between the US and Kuwait was perfectly clear, and Viorst 
				himself puts his words in italics:
				
				“By the time the crisis began in early 1990, we knew we could 
				rely on the Americans. There was an exchange of talks on the 
				ambassadorial level just before the invasion. No explicit 
				commitments were ever made, but it was like a marriage. 
				Sometimes you don’t say to your wife ‘I love you,’ but you know 
				the relationship will lead to certain things.”
[40]
				
		
				The US could not 
				quite put it down on paper that it would defend Kuwait because 
				that might deter the Iraqis from attacking. So Schwarzkopf 
				informally schmoozed the Kuwaitis for a couple of years and made 
				sure that they believed the US’s assurances.
				Now, under which 
				hypothesis is it necessary for the US ruling elite to get 
				Kuwait to provoke a war with Iraq? Under the hypothesis where 
				the US means to defend Iranian Islamism but must appear to be 
				fighting for some other reason. By getting Kuwait to provoke 
				Iraq, the US could claim in public that it was just defending an 
				innocent country, while critics of US foreign policy complained 
				bitterly that the US was just defending its Kuwaiti oil. The 
				entire debate was effectively a diversion, because ‘protecting 
				Iran as part of a pro-Islamist policy’ was not even one of the 
				hypotheses that anybody in the media put on the table to explain the Gulf 
				War.
				Under the 
				hypothesis that the US meant to protect its access to Gulf oil, 
				by contrast, it is not necessary to get Kuwait to provoke Iraq. 
				On the contrary, it is absurd. I turn to this next.
				
		
		
		
				The hypothesis that the US attacked Iraq 'for oil' is absurd
				__________________________________________________
				I understand that 
				many people think the US does everything 'for oil.' It is a 
				popular view partly because of the numbing repetition of it, and 
				repetition has an effect. But a scientist should care only 
				whether there is any evidence to support it, and whether it 
				makes logical sense.
				According to the 
				New York Times, when Jimmy Carter established Centcom in 1979 he 
				did so because he was “Fearful that the Soviet Union would take 
				advantage of Iranian instability and try to gain control of the 
				Persian Gulf oilfields.”
[41]
				Now, an ability to protect oil may be a plausible 
				side-benefit of Centcom, but it really is hard to argue that 
				this was its main purpose.
				We have seen 
				above that US policy has gone quite out of its way to sponsor 
				Islamist movements even when there is no oil involved, and 
				Brzezinski himself explained that the promotion of Afghan 
				Islamism was meant to bring down the Soviet Union. At the very 
				same time that Brzezinski inaugurated the Islamist policy, Centcom 
				was created explicitly to protect the new Islamist Republic: Iran, 
				also on the Soviet border. This is consistent with a general 
				pro-Islamist policy. By contrast, even assuming that the 
				original goal of Centcom really was to protect US oil 
				interests in the Gulf from the Soviets, nothing at all suggests that 
				Iraq had replaced the Soviet Union as a threat to these 
				interests when Centcom was reoriented in 1988 to counter Iraq. 
				Consider:
				
				1) As a potential threat to the US’s oil interests, in 1988 Iraq 
				was diminutive relative to the Soviet Union -- a virtual 
				nonentity.
				
				2) By 1988 Iraq was brutally weakened and tired by 8 years of 
				war with Iran, even it if was a little better off than Iran.
				
				3) It had plenty of its own oil, so the economic motivation to 
				attack neighboring countries for oil was weak.
				
				4) The geostrategic motivation was even weaker, because Saddam 
				Hussein knew perfectly well that anybody who attacked US puppets 
				in the Gulf would invite America's wrath (the US had already 
				made this perfectly clear during the Iran-Iraq war by putting 
				the American flag on Kuwaiti tankers).
[42]
				
		
				
				5) As we saw, getting Iraq to attack Kuwait required so much 
				effort by the United States that this point alone makes it quite 
				obvious that Iraq was not a threat to US oil interests in the 
				Gulf.
				If the US wanted 
				to protect its access to Gulf oil, all it had to do was warn the 
				Iraqis very loudly that any messing with the US's client states 
				in the Gulf would be punished. Then, if Iraq did anything, the 
				US could punish Iraq. But what the US did instead was provoke a 
				war with Iraq, when Iraq was obviously not a threat.
				This is 
				precisely what just happened, too, with Bush Jr.'s war on Iraq.
				The most 
				reasonable conclusion for the 1991 Gulf War is that the US attacked Iraq in 
				order to protect Iranian Islamism. It was "strengthening Iran 
				and containing Iraq," precisely as Zalmay Khalilzad had 
				recommended. The bulk of the evidence suggests this is also what 
				Bush Jr.'s war is all about.