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In earlier parts of this series we
have scrutinized some important—though largely unknown—behaviors of the US
power elite. The US power elite, A.
before
WWII, led, subsidized, and exported the eugenics
movement, which was forerunner, godfather, and patron of German Nazism (Part 5); B.
after
the war, recruited (at least) tens of thousands of Nazis
and collaborators, used them to create the postwar US intelligence
infrastructure, and returned them to
power in Germany and elsewhere
(Part 6). C.
also
after the war, created a psychological warfare regime to subtly
coerce mass acquiescence to their domestic and foreign policies (Part 1). I perceive a pattern. If you are a scientist you hunt for patterns in order to build a
‘model’ (a hypothetical representation of the causal structure of the world). If unfolding events do not
reasonably fit, then you tinker with your model until they do fit, and wait for new events to
unfold. And so forth. Sometimes no amount of tinkering helps. Then you need a
new model. Socially, science is a sport. There
are other players, with different models. The game: to see who produces the
model that best fits unfolding events.
As explained in Part 4,
it is power elites who make
state-level decisions, so a geopolitical scientist must build a model of
power-elite motivators
(ideologies, values, goals—i.e., what they want, and why), plans (long- and short-term
intentions), assets (what they can
use), and limits (what they can
and cannot get away with, regardless of what they want). Then we compare
unfolding geopolitical events to the model’s implications. On the question of motivators, I propose, on the above A-B-C pattern, that the US
power-elite—at least up until the immediate postwar—was dominated by a
pro-Nazi, anti-democratic group (one that successfully disguised its true
aims). This model explains the ‘appeasement’ period of the 1930s—when Western
leaders supposedly choked on their subhuman stupidity and cowardice—as
something else entirely: as cunning hypocrisy intended to bestow upon
Hitler—entirely free of charge—a key strategic advantage. “Wait a minute,” hollers the gallery,
“the US did go to war against the
German Nazis, and that decision was made by the same US power elite.” Indeed—and my model must explain this.
But allow me a brief parenthesis. In my experience people assign a high
value to their own prejudices (even scientists), and this produces analytical
asymmetries: whatever contradicts the model we dislike will seem fatal,
whereas similar flaws in our own model are swept under the rug and ignored.
Thus, if you prefer to believe the US power elite have been democratic and
anti-Nazi, the above chink—alright, enormous
dent—in my armor may restore your
confidence in the Establishment model. But allow me now to inject some
insecurity where smugness might otherwise prevail. A model—any model—must explain everything, not just a cherry-picked
handful of favorite facts. Big items must be explained first (you may
provisionally invoke ad-hoc assumptions for peripheral details but never for
the main events). An example of big—granted—is the actual exchange of fire
between the US and Nazi Germany. And the Establishment model—granted
again—has no trouble explaining that.
However, the same model must also explain points A-B-C at the top, all of them pretty big too. How will it do so?
I don’t know. But sweeping them under the rug is unsporting. Thus far, social acceptance of the
Establishment model has been helped along by certain academic and media
peculiarities. Mainstream political scientists and journalists treat as
axiomatic that the US power elite is democratically responsive (Part 3),
so any undemocratic effects of US foreign policy are interpreted—without
discussion—as unintentional ‘blunders’ or ‘fiascos’ (Part 4).
(WWII ‘appeasement’—a major supposed ‘blunder’ or ‘fiasco’—would be a case in
point.) Most egregiously, US-power-elite sponsorship of Nazis before and
after the war, plus deployment of a postwar totalitarian media system (our
points A-B-C), are simply not discussed by mainstream journalists or historians
(Part 1, Part 5,
and Part 6). I find all this most unsporting. Just as proper athletes don’t bribe
judges or trip rivals, proper scientific champions of the Establishment model
won’t slink away like thieves in the night, claiming later to have won a
prize they have stolen. They will stand in the brightly lit arena, face an
opponent, and joust. In this test,
the Establishment model survives only if it can produce compelling special reasons why points A-B-C are consistent with an
anti-Nazi US power elite. But what’s good for the goose is good
for the gander. Though my model has no trouble explaining points A-B-C, it must produce, in order to
survive, a compelling special reason
for why a pro-Nazi US power elite would enter into an official state of war
with Nazi Germany and then—finally—beat it to a pulp. I accept this
challenge. First question: Why declare war on
Nazi Germany? This one is easy. The modern West has
a liberal-democratic political grammar (Part 2),
so Nazi behavior outraged US citizens. To stay in office, a pro-Nazi US power
elite must deploy psychological warfare within this grammar; hence, declaring
war on Germany was a forced grammatical
move, necessary to establish an anti-Nazi ‘alibi’—all the more convincing
for having to swim against the tide of ‘isolationism.’ Not convinced? Point for you. For I
have immediately gotten in trouble: under this interpretation the ‘state of
war’ should have been for show,
with the US power-elite sitting on its haunches rather than putting up a real
fight. And so the gallery returns: “But if the US power elite wanted a
Nazi victory in Europe, why on Earth land troops in Normandy to fight the
Nazis?” This one is more interesting. Can I
get out of it? Chronology is the backbone of History,
so let’s examine a few dates. Roosevelt declared war on 11 December 1941, but
US troops landed in Normandy on 6 June 1944
(D-Day). This is late—just under a year before Germany’s unconditional
surrender in May 1945. By D-Day, historians agree, the Soviets had already
won—it was over. The Nazis were doomed in Europe, Normandy or no. That’s important, for it makes it
legitimate to question whether defeating the Nazis was the true reason for
the Normandy landing. To explore this issue, we must focus
on the crucial detail: At what point—exactly—did Western excuses to their official Soviet allies for not opening
a second front in Europe suddenly evaporate?
According to general agreement, the
European war turned on the Battle of Stalingrad, concluded 2 February 1943.
But historical hindsight can often be 20/20. Immediately following Stalingrad
matters were not so clear, and the nervous Soviets in fact prepared for defensive battle in the Kursk area.
They believed Moscow was still vulnerable to a renewed German offensive, and
said so to their official allies in the US and Britain. If these official ‘allies’ of the
Soviets were in fact pro-Nazi, they should have preferred here to wait and
see, hoping for a Nazi resurgence. Consistent with this, Roosevelt and
Churchill renewed their excuses to Stalin, communicating in June 1943 that for the rest of the year there were no plans
for a second front. The Germans surged tremendously at
Kursk on 4/5 July. The Red Army survived, and then—finally—switched from
defense to offense. By August they were recapturing lost territory, and by
September/October the US and Britain could see that the Soviets would keep
advancing. It was a matter of time now: the Nazis were doomed.[1] According to official historical publications of the
US military, it was immediately after this, in November 1943, that serious planning for the invasion of
Normandy began, at the Cairo Conference.[2] The
key observation: Allied planning for a second front
did not begin until after it became
obvious that the Nazis had lost the war. This is consistent with the view
that the US power elite didn’t want a Nazi defeat. What did they want? One clue to that may be found in The United States and a New World Order,
by Graeme K. Howard, vice-president of General Motors, a company that
assisted the Nazi war effort even after Pearl Harbor (see below). In his
book, published in 1941, Howard
recommended accepting a Nazi bloc in Europe and creating similar fascist
blocs in Asia and America (precisely the tripartite, planetary, super-state
structure that, as Orwell explained in ‘1984’, guaranteed a stable totalitarian
world system). The war didn’t quite turn out as
Howard hoped, and in 1944 the victorious Soviets were headed for the
Atlantic. This changed things. The US power elite would have no claim to a
European sphere of influence unless their troops were sitting there on ground
they had liberated from the German Nazis. So they invaded and got some land.
That’s my model. “Now wait just a minute!”, I hear the
gallery protest. “This hardly proves that the US power elite was ‘pro-Nazi.’
There could be any number of reasons why the Western Allies didn’t invade
Normandy earlier.” Yes. But my calling the US power elite
‘pro-Nazi’ never depended on this but rather on their sponsorship of the Nazi
movement both before and after the war, plus deployment of a postwar
totalitarian media system (points A-B-C
at the top). I merely showed, as required by the rules of scientific sport,
that the Allied landing in Normandy presents no problem for my model. My
model stands. “OK,” returns the gallery, “but the
Allies invaded Sicily and Italy before the Normandy invasion.” Sure, but not before Kursk! The Allies
invaded Sicily—which in itself would decide nothing—right as the Nazis were
surging at Kursk. But they did not invade Italy until the Nazi defeat at
Kursk became obvious. This again is consistent with my model. “But the Allies did fight the Nazis in North Africa, even before Kursk.” What’s your point? Internal British
politics required that the British
power elite fight to keep the empire. It was grammatically obligatory. British rulers had zero choice. “But, but...” returns the gallery,
less confidently now, “wouldn’t we expect, then, according to the pro-Nazi
model, that, prior to Kursk, the US power elite would have been somehow assisting the Nazi war effort?” Not opening a second front is “somehow assisting the Nazi war
effort,” especially when your official allies, the Soviets, are daily begging
for that second front. But evidence abounds, anyway, of—wartime—material assistance to the Nazis. As
my model would predict, this is hardly ever mentioned in the media or in
standard history textbooks. Historian Antony Sutton documents much
of this in Wall Street and the Rise of
Hitler: The Astonishing True Story of the American Financiers Who Bankrolled
the Nazis.[3]
Another study, American Business and Germany, 1930-1941, by historian Gabriel
Kolko (published in 1962), documents so much assistance from top US
industrialists to the German Nazis that Kolko feels forced to apologize: “It is almost superfluous to point out
that the motives of the American firms bound to contracts with German
concerns were not pro-Nazi.”[4] Kolko, notice, doesn’t look beyond
1941. Why? Because if it is “almost superfluous” to say that US powerbrokers
“were not pro-Nazi”—even though they did business with the Nazis right up
until the US declaration of war in December 1941!—then they can’t very well
have continued such business from
1942 onwards. Right? They wouldn’t risk prosecution under the Trading With
The Enemy Act. Or
would they?
Trading with
the Enemy: The Nazi-American Money Plot 1933-1949,
by historian Charles Higham (published in 1983), captures the period that
Kolko neglects, including the immediate postwar, when de-Nazification, which
had been promised, did not happen (see Part 6
for more on the lie of de-Nazification). As it turns out, Chase National Bank and Standard
Oil (both owned by the Rockefellers), ITT, Du Pont, General Motors, Ford
Motor Co., the American subsidiary of SKF, and others, including many early
patrons of the eugenics movement, continued assisting the Nazis—after the US declaration of war—with
patents, financing, and war materiel. Significantly, executives of some of
these companies were very close to Roosevelt and they, or their close allies,
were given the very positions in his administration with responsibility for prosecuting
violations of the Trading With The Enemy Act or else for granting exceptions
to the same. These companies were quite safe.[5] Much of the assistance to the Nazis
went—openly—through Franco’s Spain (employing the pretense that Spain was
‘neutral’). The scale of this was staggering, so much that an outraged Henry
Waldman, an economist, wrote an eloquent protest letter to the New York Times, published in March 1943. I emphasize the date
because this is after Stalingrad, so this aid continued until the Nazi defeat at
Kursk.[6] Can the Establishment model explain
all this? I can’t imagine how. Let us consider, anyway, the gallery’s
remaining whimpers. “But didn’t the US and British power elites
destroy Nazi war-productive capacity?” Yes, but historians agree they did
very little of this before Kursk.[7] My
model interprets the meager Allied efforts before that battle as the minimum grammatically necessary to convince
onlookers of their supposed ‘anti-Nazi’ stance. An obligatory token. “But even before Kursk, through
Lend-Lease, the US gave aid to the Soviet war effort!” All historians agree that Lend-Lease
to the Soviet Union was but a drip. Some aver, however, that small though it
was the Soviets would have perished without it.[8] I
will avoid this controversy because it cannot decide our key issue. Why not? Consider a metaphor. I give
you a gun, but to your enemy, who wants to kill you, I give a tank. Even if you, Rambo-style,
miraculously manage to defeat the tank with the gun, and even if, without
that gun, you couldn’t have done it, whoever claims that I am your ally still
has to explain why I gave the other guy a tank.
Watch closely now: both the anti-Nazi and pro-Nazi models
of the US power elite require that some
US assistance be sent to the Soviets. In the anti-Nazi model, to produce
a Soviet victory; in the pro-Nazi model, to obscure the pro-Nazi intentions—a
forced grammatical move (this is
the gun). But what only the pro-Nazi model can explain is shipments to the Nazis—and the dramatic scale
of these (this is the tank). “OK, but the Soviets were the spawn of
evil, so US-power-elite assistance to the Nazis was justified.” If you feel like defending the above
argument, then we have arrived. For this statement concedes that the US power
elite was pro-Nazi. But was it only to defeat the Soviets?
That hypothesis—one I disagree with—can be tested.
One test concerns US policy toward
Jewish victims of the Holocaust. It is a simple test. You must consider
whether the ‘only-to-defeat-the-Soviets’ hypothesis can satisfactorily
account for the following three diagnostic facts: 1) The
US power elite turned away Jews (with legally obtained visas!) who sought
refuge in the United States. 2) The
US power elite refused to bomb even the railways leading to Auschwitz. 3)
There was so much US policy to protect
the Final Solution that an outraged group of US Treasury officials authored,
in the middle of the war, a carefully documented analysis titled: Report to the Secretary on the
Acquiescence of this Government in the Murder of the Jews.[9] Can the anti-Nazi model explain that? Naturally, my model must account for many other aspects of the war. I do not
shrink from it (consult footnote [10]).
But here I am more interested in moving forward in time, for that affords new
and interesting tests of the model. Up next: Can my model account for US
policy toward Israel in the postwar period?
[1]
Roberts, G. (2006). Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (pp.155-159) [2] Leighton, R.
M. (2000). Chapter 10: OVERLORD Versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran
Conferences. In K. R. Greenfield (Ed.), Command Decisions (pp.
255-286). Washington D.C.: Center of Military History Department of the Army. [3] Sutton,
A. C. (2010[1976]). Wall
Street and the Rise of Hitler: The Astonishing True Story of how American
Financiers Bankrolled the Nazis. West Hoathly, UK: Clearview
Books. [4] Kolko, G. (1962). American Business and Germany,
1930-1941. The Western Political Quarterly, 15(4), 713-728. (p.720) [5] Higham, C. (1995[1983]). Trading
with the Enemy: The Nazi-American Money Plot 1933-1949. New York: Barnes
& Noble. NOTE: Higham’s documentation actually
comes from the US government itself, because mid-level officials at the
Interior and Treasury departments were busy documenting violations of the
Trading With The Enemy Act. However,
as Higham also documents, offenders largely escaped prosecution—despite much
persistence from Treasury and Interior Department officials—because FDR
appointed these very industrialists to the bureaucratic posts responsible for
overseeing US wartime industrial behavior. When this didn’t suffice, FDR
often intervened personally (hardly surprising, given that these industrialists
had placed Roosevelt in the White House) [6] Economist Henry Waldman sent the following letter to
the New York Times in March of 1943.
SOURCE:
“Aid to Spain Is Protested; Statement of Ambassador Hayes About Help
Extended Evokes Objection”; The New York Times; March 05, 1943; Section
‘Letters to the Times’, Page 16; by HENRY WALDMAN [7] Even historian Phillips
O’Brien, who leads a solitary fight defending the argument that “the West was
responsible for tying down and destroying a significantly larger share [of
Nazi war-productive capacity] than the Soviet Union,” makes this claim only
for the period “from 1943 onwards.” To be more precise, O’Brien concedes that
this happened only after Kursk. On the question of tanks and infantry,
he explains that before Kursk, the great majority of these German resources
were on the Eastern Front, so before this date the Allies were not in a
position to even try to reduce German tanks and infantry significantly
relative to Soviet efforts: “On 30 June 1943 2,269 German tanks
were stationed on the Eastern Front (about 72 per cent of the total), while
59 tanks were deployed in Norway 351 in France and the Low Countries, and 345
in Italy. However, after their great defeat at
Kursk, the relative proportion of German troops stationed in the East began
to decline. Seaton claims that in the autumn of 1943, while 2,800,000 men
were serving in the Wehrmacht in Russia, 2,440,000 were serving in the West
outside Germany. This shift in forces from East to West picked up steam
during the rest of the year. General Hans Guderian, who was Inspector General
of all German tank forces at this time, reports that a specific decision was
made in the autumn/winter of 1943 to withdraw troops from the East to beef up
the defenses in the West against the expected Anglo-American invasion.”
(pp.95-96) That’s tanks and infantry. What about
the Luftwaffe? When did its positional priorities change from East to West?
Once again, before Kursk, the Luftwaffe’s priority was the Eastern Front. “The Eastern Front received priority
twice, at the beginning of the year [1943] during the Stalingrad airlift, and
in June/July during the Battle of Kursk... After the summer of 1943, however,
the air defense of the Reich received the greatest priority.” (p.97) But what about Allied bombing of
German industrial production? “[Western] Bombing of Germany had
taken place, in one form or another, almost since the beginning of the war.
The impact of this bombing was originally quite muted. Between July and
August 1943 [i.e. right after the Battle of Kursk], however, this bombing
campaign took an extremely ominous turn.” (p.98; my emphasis) Once again the same pattern. Before
Kursk, almost nothing (“quite muted”). Despite O’Brien’s impassioned plea to
revise the perception of the importance of the Allied effort in the defeat of
the Nazis in Europe—against what he concedes is a crushing, nearly unanimous
consensus opposing his position—in t Did the Soviets survive because of Lend-Lease? Would
they have perished without it? As I explain in the text, it does not matter
to my model how one answers this question. But in any case, it appears that
Lend-Lease was not that important to Soviet survival. The question of the importance of US
Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union is naturally fraught with propaganda
interests on both sides. Since the Soviets defeated the Nazis on the ground,
one way for the US power elite to claim joint credit is for their academic
retainers to insist that this aid was absolutely essential to the Soviet
victory. On the other side, the Soviets traditionally downplayed the
importance of the aid they received from ‘capitalist imperialists’ and
insisted on an almost single-handed glorious victory for ‘patriotic
communists.’ So there is controversy here. Recently, against the earlier dominant
view that Lend-Lease to the Soviets had a minor impact, Albert Weeks, relying
mostly on Russian historian Boris Sokolov, has revised upwards the estimates
of how much the Soviets received from the US, and has put forth the strongest
argument that it was crucial to the Soviet victory over the Nazis. There have
been numerous criticisms against both Sokolov and Weeks. But Sokolov stands
accused of just throwing figures at the reader, without making the systematic
comparisons that might support his argument: one critic goes so far as to
call it “a limited analysis of random equipment and materials [that] lacks
context.”(a) Weeks’ work, which is mostly
derivative on Sokolov’s, has been criticized in the same terms. Historian
David Foglesong accuses that the “polemical and speculative” argument is
unconvincing, because “instead of developing a sustained argument, Weeks
relies on references to Russian scholarship and seven detailed tables of
Lend-Lease shipments,” as if raw figures of shipments were enough to
establish the importance of the same to the Soviet victory. In this vein,
“quotations and statistics [are] often thrust at the reader without being
integrated into the narrative.” Moreover, the work is “marred by factual
errors” that weaken the reader’s confidence in the author (for example, Weeks
gets the date of the important Yalta conference wrong). To cap it all, “the
bibliography is incomplete.”(b) But the above is hardly necessary.
Weeks in the end refutes himself, for he does not even reach the conclusion
that his book’s title promises. That title, Russia’s Life-Saver, leads one to
expect that Weeks will show that US Lend-Lease to the Soviets was crucial to
the Soviet victory over the Nazis, but “Ultimately, Weeks concedes that ‘the
jury is still out’ on ‘establishing exactly how crucial this aid was’
(p.134).”(b)he end he makes my argument for me. Before it became obvious, at
Kursk, that the Soviets had defeated the Nazis, the Western Allies did not
seriously try to reduce German Nazi war-productive capacity. SOURCE: O'Brien, P. P. (2000). East
versus West in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Journal of Strategic Studies,
23(2). [8] Did the Soviets survive because
of Lend-Lease? Would they have perished without it? As I explain in the text,
it does not matter to my model how one answers this question. But in any
case, it appears that Lend-Lease was not that important to Soviet survival. The question of the importance of US
Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union is naturally fraught with propaganda
interests on both sides. Since the Soviets defeated the Nazis on the ground,
one way for the US power elite to claim joint credit is for their academic
retainers to insist that this aid was absolutely essential to the Soviet
victory. On the other side, the Soviets traditionally downplayed the
importance of the aid they received from ‘capitalist imperialists’ and
insisted on an almost single-handed glorious victory for ‘patriotic
communists.’ So there is controversy here. Recently, against the earlier dominant
view that Lend-Lease to the Soviets had a minor impact, Albert Weeks, relying
mostly on Russian historian Boris Sokolov, has revised upwards the estimates
of how much the Soviets received from the US, and has put forth the strongest
argument that it was crucial to the Soviet victory over the Nazis. There have
been numerous criticisms against both Sokolov and Weeks. But Sokolov stands
accused of just throwing figures at the reader, without making the systematic
comparisons that might support his argument: one critic goes so far as to
call it “a limited analysis of random equipment and materials [that] lacks
context.”(a) Weeks’ work, which is mostly
derivative on Sokolov’s, has been criticized in the same terms. Historian
David Foglesong accuses that the “polemical and speculative” argument is
unconvincing, because “instead of developing a sustained argument, Weeks
relies on references to Russian scholarship and seven detailed tables of
Lend-Lease shipments,” as if raw figures of shipments were enough to
establish the importance of the same to the Soviet victory. In this vein,
“quotations and statistics [are] often thrust at the reader without being
integrated into the narrative.” Moreover, the work is “marred by factual
errors” that weaken the reader’s confidence in the author (for example, Weeks
gets the date of the important Yalta conference wrong). To cap it all, “the
bibliography is incomplete.”(b) But the above is hardly necessary.
Weeks in the end refutes himself, for he does not even reach the conclusion
that his book’s title promises. That title, Russia’s Life-Saver, leads one to
expect that Weeks will show that US Lend-Lease to the Soviets was crucial to
the Soviet victory over the Nazis, but “Ultimately, Weeks concedes that ‘the
jury is still out’ on ‘establishing exactly how crucial this aid was’
(p.134).”(b) SOURCES IN THIS FOOTNOTE: (a) This reviewer comments on
Sokolov’s The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A
Re-examination: “The chapter on Lend Lease seems to be
a limited analysis of random equipment and materials and again lacks
context. Yes, it is important to
stress that value of Lend Lease supplies and the fact that the Soviet Union
played down the aid it received while some in the West believed it
represented a lifeline in the fullest sense of the term. Unfortunately, Sokolov doesn’t do a great
job in getting his point(s) across. He
discusses aviation fuel but fails to offer a breakdown of deliveries by year.
There is also no breakdown of motor vehicle deliveries by year nor does
Sokolov discuss the fact that Soviet domestic production of motor vehicles
could have been increased if the need arose at the expense of light tank
production, which was being curbed as is by the latter years of the war due
to the dominance of the T-34. The reason Soviet domestic truck production was
so low was because they knew that Lend Lease trucks were supposed to be
delivered, but this is left out of Sokolov’s discussion(s). Thus, similar to
previous chapters, the author discusses important subjects and brings up
relevant examples only to then exaggerate their value and importance without
adequate context and analysis.” [9] For an overview of US policy
toward the Jews during the war, read: 1939-1945; from: IS THE US AN ALLY OF
ISRAEL; Historical and Investigative Research; by Francisco Gil-White The document entitled Report to the
Secretary on the Acquiescence of this Government in the Murder of the Jews
may be consulted here: [10]
The following work Gil-White, F. (2014). The Collapse of
the West: The Next Holocaust and its Consequences. Mexico DF: FACES
(Fundación para el Análisis del Conflicto, Étnico y Social). provides a thorough exploration of the
model, and looks at the causes, the development, and the aftermath of World
War II. Its purpose is to show that persistent paradoxes and mysteries that
historians have been unable to resolve simply melt away when the Establishment
model is abandoned in favor of the model that posits a pro-Nazi US and
British power elite. Currently this work exists only in
Spanish, but a summary of its contents may be examined in English. Much of what The Collapse contains is
already in HIR articles published in English (www.hirhome.com), and this
series in fact presents a summarized version of much of its content. |
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Letter by economist
Henry Waldman
“Aid to Spain Is Protested; Statement of
Ambassador Hayes Notify me of new HIR pieces!
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%E2%80%94appear%20clearly%20anti-Nazi.%20Don%E2%80%99t%20they%20support%20the%20view%20that%20the%20US%20power%20elite%20wanted%20a%20Nazi%20defeat?%20%0A%0AHistorical%20and%20Investigative%20Research%20%E2%80%93%2017%20May%202016,%20by%20Francisco%20Gil-White%0Ahttp%3A//www.hirhome.com/political_grammar07.htm%0A%0ACertain%20important%20events%20surrounding%20the%20causes%20and%20aftermath%20of%20WWII%20may%20be%20recruited%20to%20defend%20a%20model%20of%20the%20US%20power%20elite%20as%20pro-Nazi.%20This%20model%20naturally%20needs%20to%20provide%20satisfactory%20special%20reasons%20for%20important%20behaviors%20of%20the%20same%20power%20elite%20that%20appear%20anti-Nazi.%20But%20the%20same%20applies%20to%20the%20Establishment%20model%3A%20it%20must%20provide%20satisfactory%20special%20reasons%20to%20explain%20why,%20if%20the%20US%20power%20elite%20has%20been%20anti-Nazi,%20it%20involved%20itself%20so%20intensely%20with%20sponsorship%20and%20then%20recruitment%20of%20Nazis.%20We%20examine%20these%20issues%20here.){kind=small}
