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Picture this. Emancipated Muslim girls. And women. With guns.
Training in the hills. Crawling in the brush. Fighting door to door. Fighting
together with supportive, democratic, egalitarian Muslim men. Fighting to
defend their rights and freedoms. Pushing ISIS back. Making ISIS run! Setting
the Syrians free, one town at a time. Hailing the Syrians, Muslims and
others, to their banner: freedom and
democracy. Inspiring Westerners to come and fight the forces of darkness.
What a great fantasy novel! you say. Where can I buy it? Who
is the author? But this amazing story, one that no novelist has yet imagined,
is fact—not fiction—in northern Syria. It is the story of the Rojava
Revolution, perhaps the most democratic, gender-equal movement in the entire
world, led by the—mostly Muslim!—Syrian Kurds. It’s an anomaly. As the fictional Dr.
House—imagined as Sherlock Holmes in the hospital—always points
out to his underlings: anomalies contain important clues. To understand the
system under study, we must pay attention to them. Cherish them. This is one
reason (among many) to cherish the anomalous Rojava Revolution in northern
Syria. If we wish to understand the world geopolitical system, and in
particular US—and more broadly Western—foreign
policy in Syria and the wider Middle East, we would do well to study the
Rojava Revolution. For Western policy towards this movement, and towards its
archenemy, ISIS, can teach us a great deal about Western power-elite
ideology, intentions, and goals. We have here an interesting and useful
natural experiment that may help us decide between competing geopolitical
theories. To properly appreciate the Rojava Revolution, we must begin
with its surrounding context. That’s ISIS. After ISIS apparently claimed responsibility for another major
terrorist attack, this time in Brussels (22 March 2016), I was interviewed on
Milenio TV (Mexico). I was asked: Can the attack in Belgium be interpreted as
evidence that the fight against terrorism is failing and ISIS is winning the
war? As with so many questions that are put to me, I could not answer it, for
I was forced to dispute the premise. The attack in Belgium, I replied,
justifies a different question: Are the
Western power elites really fighting ISIS? This question is fair, particularly if you consider that ISIS
was a direct consequence of US (and secondarily British and French) policy. As HIR documented in an earlier article, ISIS
emerged from the US military prison system in Iraq, where the mingling of criminals
led to secular Baathists (originally non-religious fascists) acquiring jihadi
radicalism, and jihadi radicals acquiring Baathist organizational skills.
Result: Al Qaeda in Iraq, which soon became ISIS. Is this what the US power elite wanted? This sort of question is supposed to be absurd. Of course not!
And yet, to the expressed astonishment of former prison
detainees (some of them defectors from Al Qaeda in Iraq), the US authorities
running this enormous prison system allowed secular Iraqis and jihadists to
mix, and tolerated a takeover of the prison’s social life by a jihadist
regime that coerced any newcomers into its ideology. As the prisons burgeoned
to overflowing they became Islamist/terrorist schools—the man in charge, Maj.
General Douglas Stone, himself called it “jihadi university.” After five years—a bachelor’s degree—“jihadi university” was
closed down and its graduates were simply let go. Running free, ISIS
criminals caused a civil war in Iraq that spread to Syria. Claiming to have discovered ‘democrats’ among the ‘Syrian
rebels,’ the US announced it would seek ‘regime change.’ But according to a
key military intelligence document, since made public, the Pentagon knew the
Syrian ‘rebels’ to be a combination of ISIS and surrogates of other jihadi
powers. And yet the specific ‘rebels’ under the US, British, and
French collective wing—the Syrian National Council (SNC) and its military
branch, the Free Syrian Army (FSA)—were apparently not Islamist enough, for
these Western powers took the trouble to reorganize them, after which
Islamists dominated both groups. Once equipped with US-sponsored training and
weapons, the reorganized FSA defected en
masse to ISIS. For her part, German chancellor Angela Merkel decided to
import a staggering multitude of Syrian ‘refugees’ (most of them combat-age
men) into Europe, in fact declaring that she would not limit their number.[1] No
rocket scientists were needed to point out that ISIS terrorists claiming to
be ‘refugees’ would be entering Europe by the cartload—but Merkel persevered. Such large investments justify the hypothesis that the Western
power elites wanted ISIS. The competing hypothesis says no: they simply ‘goofed’; yes,
it turned out bad, but they faced an impossible situation with scant
alternative (besides, they are not too bright). This is the dominant
hypothesis, which you may confirm by opening almost any mainstream media or
academic publication. It never appears as a hypothesis, however, but as an obvious truth, and as such it is
never defended. In order to do geopolitical science, we must not prejudicially
pronounce any particular hypothesis as the winner before it has survived some
interesting challenges. The most obvious challenge to the dominant hypothesis
begins with a question: Was there really no obvious alternative to the
Western policies that gave birth to ISIS? Yes, there was. First, after some press reports mentioned the complaints of Iraqi
ex-detainees about how mixing everybody together in the US military prisons
amounted to a recruitment program for the jihadi terrorists, General Stone
announced that he would now separate the jihadists from the rest. So this policy was an available
alternative. But Stone began doing this just a few months before
dismantling the prison system. Why not earlier? Second, when the prison system was closed, and the criminals were
let go, the local sheiks and the Iraqi government protested loudly. They
asked for the relevant intelligence on the worst criminals so they could
arrest them and keep them in jail. So
this policy was an available alternative. But the US insisted on
releasing them. Third, given that Angela Merkel and other European Union
stalwarts were willing to foot the bill for absorbing vast numbers of Syrian
refugees, they could have simply paid for their resettlement closer to their
Syrian home, making support to other Middle Eastern countries in the fight
against ISIS conditional on their receiving the Syrian refugees. So there was a conceivable alternative.
Why wasn’t it even attempted? Finally, were the US, Britain, and France really forced to
choose between evils in the Syrian civil war? Was there no alternative to
supporting jihadi terrorists against fascist dictators and other jihadi
terrorists? Wasn’t there a truly democratic force in that war that they might
have championed? There was. The
Western powers could have supported the Rojava Revolution in northern Syria.
But they didn’t. Who are the Rojavans?
The Rojava Revolution, led by the Syrian ethnic Kurds (most of whom are of Muslim faith) but including also Assyrians, Arabs, Armenian Christians, and others, is a movement in northern Syria that, starting from the principle—almost unheard of in the Muslim world—of full equality between men and women, aims to build a democratic and liberal society based on widespread participation, limited power, and the abolition of all forms of ethnic and religious intolerance.[2] At core is the idea of “democratic confederalism,” which Abdullah Öcalan, its libertarian ideologue, explains “is open towards other political groups and factions. It is flexible, multi-cultural, anti-monopolistic, and consensus-oriented.”[3] Accordingly, the Rojavan constitution stipulates autonomous cantons, and calls for “a society free from authoritarianism, militarism, centralism and the intervention of religious authority in public affairs.” In line with strict gender egalitarianism, “The Legislative Assembly must be composed of at least forty per cent (40%) of either sex.”[4] The fighting forces of the Rojava movement are the Yekîneyên
Parastina Gel (YPG) which in Kurdish means People’s Protection
(or Defense) Units, and the Yekîneyên
Parastina Jin (YPJ) or Women’s Protection Units. The latter is an
all-female force that works together with the YPG. YPG and YPJ officers are elected by the rank and file.[5] Women soldiers, in particular, have become important not only
as a symbol of gender equality but also as a special battlefield asset, for
ISIS soldiers apparently are quite scared that a woman—to them, a
‘subhuman’—might kill them, as this would mean going to hell instead of
paradise. The Rojavans have done better than hold ISIS off—in fact, ISIS
is running scared, and the Rojavans have made significant territorial gains
at the Islamists’ expense, and appear to be much better at this than any
other group in Syria. The Rojavans have accomplished all this under extremely
difficult circumstances. Outgunned by ISIS and various other Islamist groups,
the land-locked Rojavans must also contend with a severe economic blockade
imposed by the Turkish state.
So why didn’t the Western power elites, from the beginning,
support the Rojavans? One answer might go like this. Ever since the Turkish state decided to abolish Kurdish
language, identity, and culture (it even became a punishable crime to say ‘I
am a Kurd’),[5a] the Kurds in Turkey have had an
on-off violent conflict with the Turkish state. The Turkish government is
worried that the newly-found autonomy of the Rojava Kurds may inspire the
Turkish Kurds, who may be as much as 30% of the Turkish population. This
would threaten the integrity of the Turkish state. They are equally worried
about the autonomous Kurds in Iraq, who also share a border with Turkey. For
this reason, Turkey has a policy to impede the formation of autonomous Kurdish
proto-states, both in Iraq and Syria. Thus, since the Western—NATO—power
elites are allied with Turkey, a NATO member state, it is awkward for them to
support Rojava.
That is all well and good. But ‘not supporting Rojava’ is not the same thing as ‘supporting ISIS.’ NATO powers, including Turkey, have supported ISIS. Why does that make sense? Well it makes perfect sense to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s
current president, former prime minister, and the leader of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP). Because Erdogan appears to be an Islamist. “The AKP was established in the ashes of the Welfare Party, a blatantly Islamic vehicle that Mr
Erdogan served as mayor of Istanbul. The re-engineered AK Party depicted
itself as the Muslim equivalent of the centre-right Christian Democracy
parties of Europe” (my emphasis).[6] Nobody much seems to believe the AKP’s new claim to be a
modern, secular—albeit conservative—democratic party. It is widely considered
to be an Islamist Trojan Horse, and there is no question that, under its
rule, more and more laws consistent with Sharia
or Muslim religious law have been enacted in Turkey. This almost led Turkey’s
highest court to ban the party in 2008 (but the AKP solved that in 2010 by
eliminating the independence of the judiciary).[6] As HIR has shown, there is simply no question that the Muslim
Brotherhood is a jihadist organization, so it matters that the AKP is a
strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, as this justifies the claim that
AKP’s avowed commitment to secular, democratic politics is a thorough con.[7] And the relationship between the Turkish AKP and the Muslim
Brotherhood is of great relevance to the Syrian conflict. For though the
Western media tried mightily to insist, in the beginning, that Syria was the
stage for ‘another’ democratic ‘Arab
Spring,’ the claim is as dubious in this case as in others. For the main
sponsor and agent of these ‘Arab Springs’ has been none other than the Muslim
Brotherhood, as was made painfully clear in
the case of Egypt. In Syria it is the same. As far back as 1982, the Muslim
Brotherhood was staging large uprisings in Syria, and
attempting already to take over.[7a]
In 2005, the New York Times wrote
that “the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood [is] the most popular
organization among Syria’s majority Sunnis.” Later that same year the Times wrote—now quite
disingenuously—that, “an unusually diverse collection of politicians and
activists” were calling for ‘democracy’ in Syria, and among them was “the London-based Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which
has been banned in Syria for more than two decades but is believed to enjoy
continuing popular support.”[7b]
But if the Muslim Brotherhood was already the most popular organization in
the largest Syrian demographic, then it was not simply one more organization
among many—it was leading the
supposed call for ‘democracy.’ Just as in Egypt, the ‘Arab Spring’ in Syria
was never what the Western media claimed. Since Turkey is so friendly to the Muslim Brotherhood, it matters
that the Brotherhood is quite friendly with ISIS.[7c]
It matters, too, that the
US power elite also appears quite friendly with the Muslim Brotherhood.
And look: the CIA weapons for the ‘Syrian opposition’ were “funneled mostly
across the Turkish border by way of a shadowy network of intermediaries including Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood,”[8]
to be received by the Free Syrian Army, which, after Obama’s
reorganization, ended up with a “composition… two-thirds from the Muslim
Brotherhood and its allies.”[9] These are the weapons that ended up
in ISIS hands when the Free Syrian Army joined ISIS en masse. But Erdogan doesn’t merely serve as a channel for US help to
ISIS. His AKP government has been a major direct sponsor of these radical
Islamists. As a Washington Post
investigation detailed, ISIS fighters used “the border region of a NATO member—Turkey—as
a strategically vital supply route and entry point to wage their war.” They
were also healed in Turkish hospitals.[10] But that is not all. According to a
team of researchers from the United States, Europe, and Turkey, led by David
L. Phillips (a former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Department of State), the
Turkish government also provided ISIS with military cooperation, weapons,
logistical support, and financial assistance. Not impressed yet? Consider
this: “On Sept. 20, 2014, Demir Celik, a Member of [the Turkish] Parliament
representing the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), stated that Turkish Special
Forces had joined ISIS in the battlefield.”[11] The Washington Post will
have you believe that this was all because Erdogan was “eager to aid any and
all enemies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.” But Erdogan did not eagerly
aid the Rojavans—the only secular democrats in the region. Quite to the
contrary. In fact, Turkey threatened the Rojavans with dire consequences
if they crossed West of the Euphrates river. Why? Well, because if they do
this (which they have now done), they may succeed in uniting their territory
with the—also Rojavan—territory of the Afrin Canton, and if that happens, they will seal ISIS off from Turkey
(see map).[12] If that were not quite enough, Turkey has also shelled the Rojavans.[13] It makes sense, because the Rojavans represent the most
democratic Muslim movement—perhaps the most democratic movement, period; and
Erdogan and the AKP, godfathers to ISIS, are lightly disguised jihadists. But
the political grammar is getting tricky, because Turkey is now supposedly fighting ISIS! The political grammar is especially tricky for the US power
elite. Why have they been supporting ISIS? Are they also covert jihadists in
democratic clothing?
In our hypothesis, the limited US assistance is a grammatical forcing. As Westerners
find out about the Rojavans, they fall in love, and turn them into a cause célèbre, forcing the power
elites—grammatically—to pronounce themselves in favor. But we must look
closer: these same power elites are still assisting—and more
vigorously—Rojava’s Islamist enemies. Consider what The Spectator reports: “...the US-led coalition is bombing in aid of a Syrian
[Rojavan] Kurdish militia called the YPG, the most effective ground force
against Isis... They are advancing not just against Isis but against a range
of rebel groups, including some armed by the Americans. In Syria, the US is
involved in a proxy war against itself.”[16] It seems to us, despite the tepid pro-Rojava noises heard
recently from some US officials, that the geopolitical picture is
anti-Rojava. The Rojavans will be sacrificed, just like Republican Spain was
sacrificed in the prelude to World War II. If and when that happens, the—grammatically
obligatory—narrative will be that they could not succeed, that the terrorists
did them in, etc. But look closely, and I predict that you will find a
combined Western/Turkish policy to destroy the budding—and amazing—Rojava
proto-state. If we wish for a different outcome, we must raise our voices
in favor of these Muslim democrats. As was the case for Spain, a lot is at
stake. We will explain that in a piece to follow.
Recommended readings JUST WHERE DID ISIS COME FROM? HERE COMES THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD Footnotes and Further reading
[2] This
is enunciated in the preamble of the Rojavan ‘Charter of the Social Contract’
(Constitution) which states: “We, the people of the Democratic Autonomous Regions of Afrin,
Jazira and Kobane, a confederation of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans,
Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, freely and solemnly declare and
establish this Charter, which has been drafted according to the principles of
Democratic Autonomy. In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity and democracy and led
by principles of equality and environmental sustainability, the Charter
proclaims a new social contract, based upon mutual and peaceful coexistence
and understanding between all strands of society. It protects fundamental
human rights and liberties and reaffirms the peoples’ right to
self-determination. Under the Charter, we, the people of the Autonomous Regions,
unite in the spirit of reconciliation, pluralism and democratic participation
so that all may express themselves freely in public life. In building a
society free from authoritarianism, militarism, centralism and the
intervention of religious authority in public affairs, the Charter recognizes
Syria’s territorial integrity and aspires to maintain domestic and
international peace. In establishing this Charter, we declare a political system
and civil administration founded upon a social contract that reconciles the
rich mosaic of Syria through a transitional phase from dictatorship, civil
war and destruction, to a new democratic society where civic life and social
justice are preserved.” SOURCE: http://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/charter-of-the-social-contract/ [3] Öcalan, Abdullah. 2011. Democratic Confederalism. Transmedia Publishing Ltd. (p. 21). [4] As enunciated in Article 47 of the
Rojavan ‘Charter of the Social Contract’ (Constitution), which states: “There
shall be one member of the Supreme Legislature Council per fifteen thousand
(15,000) registered voters residing within the Autonomous Region. The
Legislative Assembly must be composed of at least forty per cent (40%) of
either sex according to the electoral laws. The representation of the Syriac
community, as well as youth representation in the election lists, is governed
by electoral laws.” [5] “A member of the group seated next to
the leader intervened and said they are ‘a democratic popular militia’
because they elect their own officers in their units coming from the
different neighbourhoods.” SOURCE:
“A Rare Glimpse into Kurdish Armed Forces in Syrian Kurdistan”; Ekurd Daily; 6 August 2012; By Rozh
Ahmad [5a] “Veli Bayrak, a
prominent Kurdish writer and journalist, told Al-Monitor, ‘I grew up in a
suburb of Ankara where there is a sizable Kurdish population, so I did not
feel strongly discriminated against in my neighborhood. However, for the same
reason our community was the target of harsher police tactics. While growing
up in the 1980s and 1990s, I witnessed people being arrested because they
owned Kurdish music recordings or papers in Kurdish.” SOURCE:
“Kurdish identity becomes more acceptable in Turkish society”; Al Monitor; 22
September 2014; by Pinar Tremblay “Seraffettin
Elçi, and ethnic Kurd and former public works minister, summed up the
situation by stating that, When
I was a minister and stated in public I was a Kurd, the whole society was
shaken. It was treated as a manifesto. The whole state was in turmoil, and I
was punished under article 142. Now, when someone says he is a Kurd there is
no reaction. Things have changed, but this doesn’t mean that ‘Kurdishness’
has a legal status.” SOURCE:
Human Rights Watch. 1999. Violations of
Free Expression in Turkey. New York: Human Rights Watch. (p.95) [6] “Turkish court considers ban on
ruling party hours after blasts”; The
Daily Telegraph (London); 29 July 2008; NEWS; International; Pg. 13; by
Damien McElroy “The
‘Hidden’ That Never Was: After a decade of undisputed power, AKP can no
longer be accused of pursuing a hidden agenda. The agenda was never hidden;
it was actually obvious”; Reflections
Turkey; May 2012; by Nebil Ilseven [7] “Support for Muslim Brotherhood
isolates Turkey”; Deutsche Welle;
21 August 2013; by Ayhan Simsek [7a] “Syrians unite under fire from Assad clan’s
‘ghost’ militia”; The Sunday Times
(London), April 3, 2011 Sunday, NEWS; Pg. 24, 593 words, Hugh Macleod ; Uzi
Mahnaimi “Memory of 1982 massacre casts a pall over Hama, Syria, as
town rebuilds”; Christian Science
Monitor (Boston, MA), March 27, 1984, Tuesday, International; Pg. 7, 698
words, By Conyers A. Moye, Special to The Christian Science Monitor [7b] “U.N. is expected to pass measure
pressuring Syria”; The New York Times;
October 31, 2005; Monday, Section A; Column 6; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1, 1264
words, By WARREN HOGE and STEVEN R. WEISMAN “Syria’s Opposition Unites Behind a Call for Democratic
Changes”; The New York Times; 20
October 2005 Thursday; Late Edition – Final;
BYLINE: By KATHERINE ZOEPF; SECTION: Section A; Column 1; Foreign
Desk; Pg. 15; LENGTH: 574 words; DATELINE: DAMASCUS, Syria, Oct. 19 [7c] “The
link between Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS”; posted by Eman Nabih; last updated
31 January 2016 [8] “C.I.A. Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition”; New York Times; 21 June 2012; Page A1;
by Eric Schmitt [9] “Syrian rebels elect head of new
military command”; 8 December 2012; Reuters [10]
“In Turkey, a late crackdown on
Islamist fighters”; The Washington Post;
12 August 2014; by Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet [11]
“Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey
Links”; Columbia University [12]
“Syrian Democratic Forces Cross
over the Euphrates and Turkey’s ‘Red Line’ ”; Kurdish Question, ANF-Kobane; 26 December 2015 [13] “Turkey
shells Kurdish-held air base in Syria’s Aleppo; Bombardment comes after
Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoglu says Ankara may take military action against
Syrian Kurdish fighters”; Al Jazeera;
15 February 2016; by Diana al Rifai [14] “Syria
airstrikes: everything you need to know”; The
Guardian; 1 December 2015; by Matthew Weaver and Julian Borger [15] “UN snubs
most powerful Kurdish group at Geneva talks”; Al Jazeera; 30 January 2016; by
Basma Atassi [16] “The
myth of the plucky Kurdish warrior: Our favourite allies in Iraq and Syria
have problems and divisions of their own”; The Spectator; 27 February 2016; by Paul Wood |
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